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EXCUSING BEHAVIOR: RECLASSIFYING 
THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW DEFENSES 
OF DURESS AND NECESSITY RELYING ON 
THE VICTIM’S ROLE 
MONU BEDI*
Scholars have long debated the best way to classify the affirmative 
defenses of necessity and duress.  Necessity typically involves a defendant 
arguing that he committed the crime in order to avoid a greater evil created 
by natural forces.  Duress usually entails a defendant arguing that he 
committed the crime in order to avoid unlawful physical threats made by a 
third party.  Most scholars categorize duress as an excuse (wrongful 
conduct where the defendant is still found not culpable based upon 
mitigating circumstances) and necessity as a justification (warranted or 
encouraged conduct where the defendant is found not culpable), but their 
focus has been on state law and related jurisprudence.  This Article makes 
an original contribution to the literature by presenting a theory for 
classifying these defenses that focuses entirely on the role of the victim in 
the criminal act and ultimately categorizes both defenses as excused acts. 
 
The Article consists of two parts.  First, it surveys how federal courts 
have treated duress and necessity.  They have applied similar standards 
both during the liability and sentencing phases of trial.  Some courts 
actually have adopted a consolidated definition for these affirmative 
defenses.  This treatment suggests that duress and necessity should be 
classified in the same way. 
The second part of the Article focuses on the conceptual framework 
behind classifying these defenses.  In light of federal jurisprudence, we need 
to reexamine the methods criminal theorists have used to distinguish 
necessity and duress.  Scholars typically focus their attention on the 
defendant and what he does.  The prominent theories include appealing to 
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comments on earlier drafts.  I would also like to thank the Editors of the Journal of Criminal 
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the type of harm the defendant causes, his particular state of mind, whether 
he deserves aid from another, whether his behavior conforms to a public 
norm, or whether his actions are warranted.  However, none of these five 
approaches provides a comprehensive methodology that accurately 
captures the nature of duress and necessity.  Nor do any of them preserve 
our intuitions when applied to other affirmative defenses such as self-
defense and insanity. 
The problem is that theorists have focused too heavily on the 
defendant.  In doing so, they have left out the victim—the central figure who 
suffers the harm.  This Article seeks to change this defendant-oriented 
perspective when it comes to classifying duress and necessity.  The final 
part of the Article outlines an alternative theory that focuses entirely on the 
victim’s role in the crime.  As the person who was harmed by the 
defendant’s conduct, the victim should be our focus when deciding whether 
the defendant’s conduct constitutes an excused or justified act.  Where the 
victim played a direct role in what happened, the defendant’s action is 
better classified as a justification, and where the victim innocently suffered, 
the defendant’s action is better classified as an excuse.  This focus on the 
victim’s culpability more accurately captures the intuitive difference 
between excuse and justification and explains why duress and necessity 
(particularly as used by federal courts) should be classified together as 
excused acts. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written on the affirmative defenses of duress and 
necessity.1
 
1 See generally 2 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES, §§ 121, 161 (1984); Marc 
O. DeGirolami, Culpability in Creating the Choice of Evils, 60 ALA. L. REV. 597 (2009); 
Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its 
Proper Limits, 62 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1331 (1989); Arnold N. Enker, In Support of the 
Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 273 (2009); Michael H. 
Hoffheimer, Codifying Necessity: Legislative Resistance to Enacting Choice-of-Evils 
Defenses to Criminal Liability, 82 TULSA L. REV. 191 (2007); Peter Westen & James 
Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification, Not an Excuse—and Why It 
Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833 (2003). 
  Necessity typically involves a defendant arguing that he 
committed the crime in order to avoid a greater harm created by natural 
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forces.2  Duress usually entails a defendant arguing that he committed the 
crime in order to avoid unlawful physical threats made by a third party.3  
Neither defense negates a defendant’s mens rea or criminal state of mind; 
rather, these defenses serve to “negate[] a conclusion of guilt.”4  The 
defendant thus typically bears the burden of proving these affirmative 
defenses.5
 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (noting that necessity 
involves a “situation where physical forces beyond the actor’s control rendered illegal 
conduct the lesser of two evils”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1981) (“Conduct that the actor 
believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable 
provided that . . . the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that 
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged.”); 1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL 
LAW § 90 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 15th ed. 2009) (“[T]he actor engages in the conduct out of 
necessity to prevent a greater harm from occurring”); 22 C.J.S. Criminal § 57 (2009) (“A 
necessity defense traditionally covers the situation where physical forces beyond the actor’s 
control rendered the actor’s illegal conduct the lesser of two evils.”); Dressler, supra note 
 
1, 
at 1347 (“[N]ecessity exculpates when, as the result of a naturally-caused condition, ‘a man 
has his choice of two evils before him, and, being under a necessity of choosing one, he 
chooses the least pernicious of the two.’”) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *31–32); Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 1, at 849 . 
3 See, e.g., Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409 (finding that duress involves a situation “where the 
actor was under an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury, which threat 
caused the actor to engage in conduct violating the literal terms of the criminal law”); 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (“It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the 
conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a 
threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, that a person of 
reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.”); 1 WHARTON’S 
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 2 at § 52 (“[W]hen a defendant engages in conduct which would 
otherwise constitute a crime, it is a defense that he was coerced to do so by the use or 
threatened use of physical force upon him or upon a third person.”); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, 
supra note 2 at § 59 (“Three elements must be shown to establish duress: an immediate or 
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; a well-grounded or reasonable fear that the 
threat will be effected; and no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm, except 
by committing the criminal act.”); Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 1, at 849. 
4 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 402. 
5 See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 2 (2007) (noting that at common law the 
defendant generally bears the burden of proving affirmative defenses and specifically finding 
that, where Congress is silent on the issue, the burden of showing duress rests with 
defendant); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (finding that state did not 
violate due process by making the defendant prove his affirmative defense); United States v. 
Jumah, 493 F.3d 868, 873 n.2 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that Dixon’s discussion of burden of 
persuasion applied to other affirmative defenses not just duress); Madeline Engel, 
Unweaving the Dixon Blanket Rule: Flexible Treatment to Protect the Morally Innocent, 87 
OR. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (2008) (“Traditionally, the burden to prove these affirmative 
defenses, indeed all ‘circumstances of justification, excuse, or alleviation,’ rested with the 
defendant.”) (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 693 (1975)). 
578 MONU BEDI [Vol. 101 
Scholars have extensively examined whether necessity and duress are 
properly understood as excused or justified acts.6  These quasi-legal labels 
seek to capture the overall nature of such defenses.  A justification defense 
exculpates otherwise criminal conduct because the conduct is not wrongful 
and benefits society or is socially useful.7  An excuse defense also 
exculpates otherwise criminal conduct, only this time the conduct is deemed 
wrongful, but the defendant is not blameworthy because of the specific 
circumstances surrounding the offense.8  Most scholars classify duress as an 
excuse and necessity as a justification.9
Despite this wealth of scholarship, few have focused on how federal 




6 See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 
  To the extent scholars have 
examined the application of these defenses, not surprisingly, they have 
1, at 1351–60; Daniel Varona Gómez, Duress and the 
Antcolony’s Ethic: Reflections on the Foundation of the Defense and Its Limits, 11 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 615 (2008); Kyron Huigens, Duress Is Not a Justification, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 303 (2004); Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 1, at 896. 
7 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 7 (2003) (“[J]ustified action is not wrongful . . . .”); Elaine M. Chiu, Culture as 
Justification, Not Excuse, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1317, 1327–28 (2006); Eugene R. Milhizer, 
Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What They Ought to Be, 78 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 726 (2004) (“Justification defenses focus on the act and not the 
actor—they exculpate otherwise criminal conduct because it benefits society, or because the 
conduct is in some other way judged to be socially useful.”). 
8 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 7, at 7 (“[E]xcused action is wrongful conduct for which 
the actor is not ‘morally responsible . . . .’”); Chiu, supra note 7, at 1326–27; Milhizer, supra 
note 7, at 726 (“Excuse defenses focus on the actor and not the act—they exculpate even 
though an actor’s conduct may have harmed society because the actor, for whatever reason, 
is not judged to be blameworthy.”). 
9 See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 130–43 (1998); 2 
ROBINSON, supra note 1, at §§ 124, 177; Laurie Kratky Doré, Downward Adjustment and 
Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress in the Defense of Battered Defenders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 
665, 745 (1995) (noting that most scholars classify necessity as a justification and duress as 
an excuse); Dressler, supra note 1, at 135–51 (noting that necessity is a justification but 
finding that some scholars also define duress as a justification and arguing that this 
classification is not tenable); Gómez, supra note 6 (arguing that necessity is classified as a 
justification whereas duress should be classified as an excuse); Huigens, supra note 6 
(arguing that duress is better classified as an excuse not a justification); Kent Greenawalt, 
Violence—Legal Justification and Moral Appraisal, 32 EMORY L.J. 437, 443 n.10 (1983).  
But see Donald L. Horowitz, Justification and Excuse in the Program of the Criminal Law, 
49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 125 (1986) (noting that duress and necessity are instances 
of excused acts); Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 1, at 896–900 (arguing that while most 
scholars classify duress as an excuse this defense is better understood as a justification).  See 
generally Miriam Gur-Arye, Should the Criminal Law Distinguish Between Necessity as a 
Justification and Necessity as an Excuse?, 102 LAW Q. REV. 71 (1986). 
10 See Stephen S. Schwartz, Is There a Common Law Necessity Defense in Federal 
Criminal Law?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1259 (2008) (analyzing the use of necessity by federal 
courts). 
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limited themselves to state law or related jurisprudence.11  Federal criminal 
jurisdiction is restrictive and thus precludes many crimes where duress and 
necessity would naturally be invoked.12
The first part of this Article examines how federal courts have 
analyzed duress and necessity during the liability phase, as well as how 
sentencing judges have departed from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based 
on these affirmative defenses.  Federal courts by and large have applied the 
same standard when examining the permissibility of these defenses.  Some 
federal courts have gone further and explicitly adopted a consolidated 
definition for these two defenses in the context of certain crimes.  This 
treatment suggests that duress and necessity (at least as interpreted by 
federal courts) should be categorized together as either excused or justified 
acts. 
  Still, it is worthwhile to focus on 
this subset of cases, even if it represents a smaller pool.  Surveying federal 
common law on the subject provides a unique perspective that may better 
inform our understanding on how to classify duress and necessity. 
The second part of the Article focuses on the conceptual framework 
behind classifying these defenses.  In light of federal jurisprudence, we 
need to reexamine the methods criminal theorists have used to distinguish 
necessity and duress.  This Article synthesizes and evaluates the five main 
theories on the subject, which focus on the defendant and what he does.  
These prominent theories include appealing to the type of harm the 
defendant causes, his particular state of mind, whether he deserves aid from 
another, whether his behavior conforms to a public norm, or whether his 
actions are warranted.  Each relies on unique methodology intended to 
distinguish excused from justified acts.  However, none of these approaches 
provides a comprehensive theory that accurately captures the nature of 
duress and necessity.  Nor does any of them preserve our intuitions when 
used to analyze other affirmative defenses such as self-defense and insanity.  
 
11 See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 1 (focusing on the Model Penal Code and state law 
in understanding the necessity defense); Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 1 (focusing on 
the Model Penal Code in understanding the duress defense). 
12 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2006) (“The district courts of the United States shall 
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the 
laws of the United States.”); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (finding federal criminal 
jurisdiction limited by the Commerce Clause); Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 
(1893) (“The courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over offenses not made 
punishable by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States . . . .”); Peters v. United 
States, 94 F. 127, 131 (9th Cir. 1899) (“It must be borne in mind that the national courts do 
not resort to common law as a source of criminal jurisdiction.  Crimes and offenses 
cognizable under the authority of the United States can only be such as are expressly 
designated by law.  It devolves upon congress to define what are crimes, to fix the proper 
punishment, and to confer jurisdiction for their trial.”). 
580 MONU BEDI [Vol. 101 
 The main problem is that theorists have focused too heavily on the 
defendant.  In doing so, they have left out the victim—the central figure 
who suffers the harm.  This Article seeks to change this defendant-oriented 
perspective when it comes to classifying duress and necessity.  It posits an 
alternative theory that centers completely on the victim’s role in the crime.  
As the person who was harmed by the defendant’s conduct, the victim 
should be our focus when morally judging the defendant’s conduct.  Where 
the victim played a direct role in what happened, the defendant’s act of 
necessity or duress is better classified as a justification, and where the 
victim innocently suffered, the defendant’s act is better classified as an 
excuse.  This emphasis on the victim’s culpability in the criminal act 
provides a more consistent and intuitive approach to understanding the 
distinction between justification and excuse.  It also properly places duress 
and necessity in the same category as excused acts.  
The Article consists of eight parts.  Parts II through IV explore how 
federal courts define and analyze duress and necessity during the liability 
phase of trial.  Part V specifically addresses how courts have interpreted 
these defenses under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.  Part VI focuses on 
the basic concepts of excuse and justification and how federal courts 
analyze the defenses of self-defense and insanity.  Part VII critically 
examines the methods by which scholars classify necessity and duress, 
including why they usually classify the former as a justification and the 
latter as an excuse.  Part VIII presents a victim-based theory that explains 
why both defenses are more appropriately classified as excused acts. 
II. FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE ON DEFINING AND ANALYZING THE 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF NECESSITY 
A. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
The first reference to necessity as a defense to a violation of law 
appears to come from admiralty cases.13
 
13 See, e.g., The New York, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 59, 68 (1818) (“The necessity must be 
urgent, and proceed from such a state of things as may be supposed to produce on the mind 
of a skilful mariner, a well grounded apprehension of the loss of vessel and cargo, or of the 
lives of the crew.  It is not every injury that . . . will excuse the violation of the laws of 
trade.”); Brig Struggle v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 71, 76 (1815) (finding 
insufficient evidence for defense of necessity where ship had to sail for the West Indies to 
preserve cargo and protect lives of crew); Brig James Wells v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 22, 25–26 (1812) (finding necessity defense applicable where weather and leaky 
vessel forced claimant to port ship and violate embargo law must be clear and positive).  
  In Brig Struggle v. United States, 
for instance, the Supreme Court heard a case involving an American 
registered vessel that violated certain commercial laws by making port in 
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the West Indies without making the appropriate bond to the United States.14  
The claimant relied on the defense of necessity, arguing that based on 
unexpected inclement weather, he was forced to port in the West Indies to 
protect the cargo and the lives of the crew.15  While the Court recognized 
the permissibly of this defense, it noted that the claimant must provide 
sufficient evidence that his actions were necessary.  The Court ultimately 
rejected a necessity defense on the instant facts because the proffered 
evidence did not support the purported “magnitude of injuries” or 
“imminence of the danger to . . . the vessel and crew.”16
United States v. Kirby seems to be the first Supreme Court case that 
discussed, albeit as dicta, the necessity defense in the criminal context.
 
17  
The Court reasoned that to prevent injustice or “absurd consequence[s,]” 
common sense sometimes requires exceptions to the application of laws.18  
Referencing a law that punished a person who “drew blood in the streets,” 
the Court stated that this law should not apply to a surgeon who “opened 
the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit.”19  Similarly, the 
Court noted that a prisoner who breaks out of a jail that is on fire should not 
be guilty of a felony because he tried to avoid getting burnt.20
It was not until United States v. Bailey that the Court explicitly 
discussed the contours of the necessity defense and applied it to the facts at 
hand.
 
21  The defendants were convicted of escaping from federal prison.22  
One of the issues before the Court was whether the defendants were entitled 
to a jury instruction on necessity based on the threats of death by prison 
guards and other severe conditions at the prison that purportedly prompted 
their escape.23  The Court defined necessity as a “choice of evils . . . where 
physical forces beyond the actor’s control rendered illegal conduct the 
lesser of two evils.”24  The Court reasoned that “where A destroyed [a] dike 
in order to protect more valuable property from flooding, A could claim a 
defense of necessity.”25
 
14 Brig Struggle, 13 U.S. at 71–72. 
  The Court went on to say that this defense is only 
15 Id. at 72. 
16 Id. at 75–76. 
17 United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868).  The Court does not explicitly use the term 
“necessity” though it is clear that this is the principle being invoked.   
18 Id. at 486. 
19 Id. at 487. 
20 Id. 
21 444 U.S. 394 (1980). 
22 Id. at 397. 
23 Id. at 395–98. 
24 Id. at 410. 
25 Id. 
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available where there is no “reasonable, legal alternative to violating the 
law.”26  Without deciding the issue of whether the defense of necessity can 
be invoked for prison escape, the Court concluded that the defendants were 
not entitled to the defense on the instant facts.27  The Court found that the 
defendants made no effort to surrender or return to custody after their 
escape and therefore could not avail themselves of the necessity defense.28
In United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, some 
twenty years later, the Supreme Court revisited the necessity defense.
 
29  The 
case involved a cooperative organization that was distributing marijuana to 
patients pursuant to a California initiative but in violation of the federal 
Controlled Substance Act.30  The cooperative contended that providing this 
marijuana was medically necessary and the only way to alleviate the 
“severe pain and other debilitating symptoms of [its] patients.”31  The Court 
first noted that it is an “open question whether federal courts ever have 
authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute.”32  
Relying on United States v. Bailey, the Court defined such a defense as a 
situation where physical forces beyond the defendant’s control made him 
commit the lesser of two evils.33  The Court went on to say that the defense 
could not succeed in the instant case where the relevant statute “le[ft] no 
doubt that the defense is unavailable.”34  The Court found that even though 
the Controlled Substances Act did not explicitly preclude a necessity 
defense, the statute reflects “a determination that marijuana has no medical 
benefits worthy of an exception.”35
B. FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Federal circuits have further elaborated on the contours of the 
necessity defense.  A typical characterization of the defense includes the 
following requirements: (1) “[the defendants] were faced with a choice of 
evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) they acted to prevent imminent harm; (3) 
they reasonably anticipated a direct causal relationship between their 
conduct and the harm to be averted; and (4) they had no legal alternatives to 
 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 412. 
28 Id. at 415.  The Court also addressed the permissibility of a duress instruction and 
came to the same conclusion.  Id. 
29 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
30 Id. at 486–87. 
31 Id. at 487. 
32 Id. at 490. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 491. 
35 Id. 
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violating the law.”36  The lesser-evil requirement functions as a 
straightforward utilitarian determination.37  “What all the traditional 
necessity cases have in common is that the commission of the ‘crime’ 
averted the occurrence of an even greater ‘harm.’”38  For instance, the Ninth 
Circuit explicitly found that violating the Controlled Substances Act to 
prevent the severe physical suffering of the defendant satisfied the lesser-
evil prong of the necessity defense.39  To find otherwise and “forgive a 
crime taken to avert a lesser harm would fail to maximize social utility.”40
The imminence requirement simply means that the harm must be 
immediate.
 
41  For example, one circuit court found that the necessity 
defense was not available in a civil disobedience case because, among other 
things, the supposed harm was simply the existence of the law or policy in 
question.42  Any harm resulting from this policy was generalized and 
therefore “too insubstantial an injury to be legally cognizable.”43
Defendants are also required to show that their actions would in fact 
avert the lesser harm.
 
44  The First Circuit examined this causal requirement 
in the context of protests at a naval base surrounding certain live-fire 
exercises.45
 
36 United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Abigail Alliance 
for Better Access to Developmental Drugs and Wash. Legal Found. v. Von Eschenbach, 495 
F.3d 695, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980), for 
the proposition that the necessity defense involves physical forces that require the defendant 
to choose the lesser of two evils); United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 638 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(finding similar elements for the necessity defense); United States v. Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 26 
(1st Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(finding that necessity defense not applicable because defendant’s actions were result of 
human coercion and not physical forces of nature); United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 
1162–63 (5th Cir. 1982) (same)). 
  The protestors argued that their illegal reentry was necessary to 
avert a greater evil, namely the continual bombing of lands presumably 
37 See, e.g., Schoon, 971 F.2d at 197 (“[T]he necessity doctrine is utilitarian.”). 
38 Id. at 196. 
39 Raich v. Gonzalez, 500 F.3d 850, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2007).  The Raich Court found that 
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. at 483, did not necessarily “foreclose[] a 
necessity defense to a prosecution of a seriously ill defendant under the Controlled 
Substances Act.”  Id. at 860, 869. 
40 Schoon, 97 F.2d at 197; see also Gant, 691 F.2d at 1164 (“If the criminal act cannot 
abate the threatened harm, society receives no benefit from the criminal conduct . . . .”). 
41 See, e.g., Raich, 500 F.3d at 860 (finding that the imminence requirement was satisfied 
because “[a]ll medical evidence in the record suggests that, if [defendant] were to stop using 
marijuana, the acute chronic pain and wasting disorders would immediately resume”). 
42 Schoon, 971 F.2d at 197. 
43 Id. 
44 United States v. Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2002). 
45 Id. 
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occupied by endangered or threatened animals.46  The First Circuit found 
that the defendants could not show that their protests would cause “a 
change of U.S. Naval policy so that the bombing and ammunition testing 
[would] cease.”47
Defendants must also show that they had no reasonable legal 
alternative to committing the crime.  For example, the Tenth Circuit found 
that the necessity defense was not available to a defendant who illegally 
possessed a loaded pistol for a short a period of time purportedly for the 
sole purpose of taking it away from his twelve-year-old brother.
 
48  The 
Tenth Circuit found that, among other things, the defendant had other legal 
alternatives such as taking his brother back to the owner of the pistol to 
return it or ordering his brother to put the pistol on the ground while he 
reported it to the police.49
Courts apply an objective standard when assessing the elements of the 
necessity defense.
 
50  It is not sufficient that a defendant subjectively 
believed that the harm was imminent or that there was no legal alternative.51  
What matters is whether a reasonable person would have come to the same 
conclusion.  The Ninth Circuit, for example, approved a jury instruction on 
necessity that required a finding that the defendant’s belief in the 





48 United States v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d 1113, 1123 (10th Cir. 2006).  The court also 
found that the supposed danger of the defendant’s younger brother possessing a firearm for a 
short while did not rise to an imminent threat.  Id. at 1125. 
49 Id. 
50 See, e.g., United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The law could 
not function where people are allowed to rely on their subjective beliefs and value judgments 
in determining which harms justified the taking of criminal action.”); United States v. Lopez, 
885 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Schmuck v. United 
States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989) (“The language used by the Bailey Court need not . . . imply a 
subjective standard . . . .  We conclude that Bailey and the decisions of this circuit establish 
an objective test.”). 
51 Schoon, 971 F.2d at 197; Lopez, 885 F.2d at 1433. 
52 Lopez, 885 F.2d at 1434. 
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III. FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE DEFINING AND ANALYZING THE 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF DURESS 
A. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
Some of the early Supreme Court cases addressing the defense of 
duress involve contract law.53  The Court in these cases examined whether a 
contract may be invalid because it was executed under duress.54  In defining 
this term, the Court noted that “[a]ctual violence is not necessary.”55  In one 
case, for instance, the Court defined duress as “that degree of constraint or 
danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, which is 
sufficient, in severity or in apprehension, to overcome the mind and will of 
a person of ordinary firmness.”56  In another, it defined the term as “moral 
compulsion, such as that produced by threats to take life or inflict great 
bodily harm . . . .”57
United States v. Bailey provides the first detailed discussion of duress 
in the criminal context.
 
58  The Court explained that under common law, 
duress can excuse criminal conduct “where the actor was under an unlawful 
threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury, which threat caused the 
actor to engage in conduct violating the literal terms of the criminal law.”59  
The Court noted that duress covered situations where the coercion came 
from human beings rather than physical forces.60  In this way, “where A 
destroyed a dike because B threatened to kill him if he did not, A would 
argue that he acted under duress.”61
 
53 See, e.g., Hartsville Oil Mill v. United States, 271 U.S. 43 (1926); Baker v. Morton, 79 
U.S. 150 (1870); Brown v. Pierce, 74 U.S. 205, 214 (1868) (noting that “a deed or other 
written obligation or contract, procured by means of duress, is inoperative and void”). 
  The Bailey Court ultimately rejected 
54 Baker, 79 U.S. at 157; Brown, 74 U.S. at 214. 
55 Brown, 74 U.S. at 214. 
56 Id. 
57 Baker, 79 U.S. at 158. 
58 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).  United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. 346 
(1795), seems to be the first federal case that addressed duress in the criminal context (in 
relatively less detail than in Bailey).  The case involved a defendant who was charged with 
treason for his role as an insurgent.  The defendant argued that he was under duress or fear 
from the leader of the rebellion.  Id. at 347.  The district court rejected this excuse as legally 
insufficient.  Id.  The court explained that the duress “must proceed from an immediate and 
actual danger, threatening the very life of the party.”  Id.  The court found that “loss of 
property” or “apprehension of slight or remote injury to a person” are not sufficient to 
excuse the criminal conduct.  Id. 
59 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409. 
60 Id. at 410. 
61 Id. 
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the application of duress on the same grounds as the necessity defenses—
namely the defendants made no efforts to surrender after their escape.62
In Dixon v. United States, the Supreme Court had occasion to 
comment, albeit as dicta, on the specific elements of duress.
 
63  The Court 
noted that no federal statute had defined the term nor had the Court 
previously specified the elements of the defense.64
(1) [he] was under an unlawful and imminent threat . . . of death or serious bodily 
injury; (2) [he] had not recklessly or negligently placed [himself] in [this] situation; 
(3) [he] had no reasonable, legal alternative . . . and (4) that a direct causal 
relationship [existed] between the criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened 
harm.
  Without officially 
adopting a definition, the Court accepted the district court’s description of 
the elements of duress.  Under this formulation, a defendant has to show 
that  
65
The Court did not discuss the elements any further as the only issue before 




B. FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Federal circuits have by and large adopted a definition of duress 
similar to the one discussed in Dixon.  A typical definition includes the 
following elements: “(1) [the defendant] acted under an immediate threat of 
serious bodily injury; (2) he had a well-grounded belief that the threat 
would be carried out; and (3) he had no reasonable opportunity to escape or 
otherwise frustrate the threat.”67
 
62 Id. at 410, 415. 
 
63 548 U.S. 1 (2006). 
64 Id. at 5 n.2. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 17 (finding that the defendant bears the burden of persuasion for the defense of 
duress). 
67 United States v. Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing the same three 
elements); United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Bravo, 489 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Lizalde, 38 F. App’x 657, 
659 (2d Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Miller, 59 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); 
United States v. King, 879 F.2d 137, 139 (4th Cir. 1989); 1A FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. 
§ 19:02 (6th ed. 2009) (federal jury instructions on duress or coercion describing the same 
three elements of serious bodily injury, reasonableness of belief, and no reasonable 
opportunity to escape threat).   
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The elements of immediacy and reasonable alternative are similar to 
those required under a necessity defense.68  For instance, the Ninth Circuit 
found that a defendant who illegally reentered the United States did not 
make a sufficient proffer that he was under an imminent threat of serious 
bodily harm.69  The defendant only proffered vague threats against him and 
his family by unnamed individuals in his native country.70  The Ninth 
Circuit distinguished this case from one involving a defendant who 
proffered evidence that he was under repeated, specific threats by named 
individuals who were constantly watching him.71  The court found that the 
latter defendant had made a sufficient proffer of the immediacy of the 
threats in connection with his drug smuggling.72
The application of a duress defense also requires that a defendant have 
no legal alternative to committing the crime.  The Second Circuit, for 
example, found that a defendant who distributed cocaine could not avail 
himself of the duress defense because there was “no legally sufficient 
evidence to show that he lacked a reasonable opportunity to escape the 
threatened danger other than by engaging in the . . . unlawful activity.”
 
73  
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit found that a defendant convicted of drug-
related offenses could not use the duress defense because she “did not 
present evidence that she could have avoided [threats by the Mexican 
mafia] only by agreeing to help sell drugs, with no reasonable opportunity 
to seek protection from law enforcement.”74  Finally, as with the necessity 
defense, the elements of duress must also survive certain objective scrutiny.  
“A defendant’s fear of death or serious bodily injury is generally 
insufficient.  Rather, ‘[t]here must be evidence that the threatened harm was 
present, immediate, or impending.’”75
 
68 See, e.g., Sawyer, 558 F.3d at 712 (finding that “fear of future violence . . . does not 
entitle [defendant] to a duress defense”); Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d at 798; Miller, 59 
F.3d at 422 (finding that threats by defendant’s husband who was in jail were not immediate 
to satisfy duress instruction for crime of bank fraud and transportation of stolen vehicle); 
King, 879 F.2d at 139 (finding that threats by third party were not sufficiently immediate to 
satisfy duress for crime of making false statements to grand jury). 
 
69 Vasquez-Landaver, 572 F.3d at 803. 
70 Id. at 803. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 United States v. Lizalde, 38 F. App’x 657, 660 (2d Cir. 2002). 
74 United States v. Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705, 712 (7th Cir. 2009). 
75 Id. at 711 (citing United States v. Tanner, 941 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1991)); United States 
v. Flores-Vasquez, 279 F. App’x 312, 313 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that “objective review” of 
evidence is required for duress instruction).  
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IV. FEDERAL COURTS USE A SIMILAR STANDARD WHEN APPLYING THE 
DEFENSES OF DURESS AND NECESSITY 
A. APPLICATION OF FORMAL ELEMENTS OF DURESS AND NECESSITY 
The formal definitions of duress and necessity share some elements.  
Both require an imminent threat of harm where the defendant has no 
reasonable legal alternative.  However, the definitions appear to diverge in 
certain respects.  As an initial matter, necessity seems to focus on natural 
threats76 whereas duress seems to involve only human threats.77  But this 
turns out to be a distinction without a difference.  First, as I will argue 
later,78 this apparent difference should not influence the classification of 
these defenses as excused or justified acts.  Second, federal courts have not 
applied necessity only in cases involving natural forces.79  The Bailey Court 
itself applied the defense to a case involving threats by prison guards.80  
The First and Tenth Circuits also entertained the use of the necessity 
defense in situations involving human threats caused by the Navy to 
endangered animals or created by a twelve-year-old boy’s possession of a 
loaded pistol.81
The more significant difference comes from the defenses’ respective 
requirements of lesser evil and serious bodily harm.  Necessity involves a 
choice between two evils but makes no mention of the kind of threat 
required.  Conversely, duress requires the threat of serious bodily injury but 
makes no mention of choosing a lesser harm.  This leaves open the potential 
for these defenses applying in very different circumstances. 
 
The Bailey Court characterizes the typical necessity defense as a 
situation where A destroys a dike in order to protect more valuable property 
from flooding.82
 
76 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980); United States v. Contento-
Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that necessity defense not applicable 
because defendant’s actions were result of human coercion not physical forces). 
  Federal circuits courts track this definition by focusing on 
choosing the lesser harm without mentioning the nature of the harm 
77 See, e.g., Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409–10; supra subpart III.B (the formal definition of 
duress used by federal circuits uses the term “threat,” suggesting a human source). 
78 See supra subpart VII.A. 
79 In fact, the definition used by federal circuits does not include reference to physical or 
natural forces.  See infra subpart II.B. 
80 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 396–99. 
81 United States v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d 1113, 1123 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2002).   
82 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410. 
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averted.83  This characterization leaves the impression that necessity, unlike 
duress, does not require the threat of serious bodily harm.  As long as the 
harm being averted (destruction of the more valuable property) is greater 
than the harm caused (destroying the dike), the necessity defense could 
apply.  Yet, as a matter of practice, federal courts have generally considered 
the defense of necessity only in situations where an individual seeks to 
avoid threats of serious bodily injury.  Bailey itself involved defendants 
who wanted to avoid life-threatening prison conditions.84  Federal circuits 
similarly have entertained this defense in cases where the defendant sought 
to avoid serious injury to his ship’s crew85 or serious pain and suffering of 
certain patients.86
The Bailey Court characterizes the typical duress defense as a situation 
where a defendant is under an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious 
bodily injury.
  So courts have implicitly applied a serious bodily injury 
requirement to necessity cases, even though this element is not part of the 
formal definition. 
87  There is no explicit mention of balancing of harms.  
Federal circuits similarly only focus on the nature of the threat imposed.88  
This characterization of duress leaves the impression that duress, unlike 
necessity, does not require a balancing of harms.  As long as the defendant 
was threatened by serious bodily injury, he may be excused from 
committing a more serious crime.  In this way, the duress defense could be 
available to a defendant who causes bodily harm to an innocent bystander 
because of a similar threat against the defendant from a third party.  
However, as a matter of practice, federal courts have only considered the 
use of this defense in situations where the harm caused was less than the 
threatened injury.  In Bailey, the defendants violated federal custody laws to 
avoid threats to their life.89  Circuit courts have followed suit and have 
entertained this defense in situations where defendants violated immigration 
laws because of serious threats to the defendant and his family90 or violated 
drug distribution laws because of threats by the mafia.91
 
83 See supra subpart II.B; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 explanatory note 4 (1981)  
(“[T]he defenses of duress and choice of evils will be independently considered, and that the 
fact that a defense is unavailable under one section will not be relevant to its availability 
under the other.”) 
  In each of these 
84 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 396–99. 
85 Brig Struggle v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 71 (1815). 
86 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
87 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409. 
88 See supra subpart III.B; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, explanatory note 4.  
89 Bailey, 444 U.S at 396–99. 
90 United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 803 (9th Cir. 2008). 
91 United States v. Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705, 721 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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instances, the harm to be averted (threats of bodily harm) was greater than 
the harm caused (violations of federal custody, immigration, and drug 
laws).92
B. A CONSOLIDATED DEFINITION FOR DURESS AND NECESSITY 
  So federal courts have implicitly applied a lesser-harm principle to 
duress cases, even though this element is not part of the formal definition. 
So far, I have restricted the analysis to federal jurisprudence that at 
least formally distinguishes between the defenses of duress and necessity.  
But in the context of at least one kind of crime, some federal circuits have 
adopted a consolidated definition for both defenses.  With felon-in-
possession cases, these courts have used a unified “justification” defense 
that incorporates both duress and necessity.93  As one circuit has noted, 
“[i]n modern times, the traditionally separate defenses of necessity and 
duress have become increasingly blurred in modern decisions, to the point 
of merger.”94
The First Circuit, in United States v. Leahy, provides a typical analysis 
of the consolidated defense.
 
95  In this case, the defendant was convicted of 
being a felon in possession of a firearm.96  He claimed that he possessed the 
gun to “scare away attackers who were attempting to inflict serious bodily 
injury on him.”97  The main issue on appeal was whether the district court 
erred in telling the jury that the defendant had the burden of proving the 
justification defense.98  The court ultimately found that the district judge 
correctly placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant.99
 
92 See also, e.g., United States v. Miller, 59 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 1995) (defendant 
committed bank fraud because of alleged physical threats by defendant’s husband); United 
States v. King, 879 F.2d 137, 139 (4th Cir. 1989) (defendant made false statements to grand 
jury based on alleged physical threats). 
  In reaching 
its conclusion, the First Circuit discussed the contours of this affirmative 
93 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 485 F.3d 569, 572 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (using a 
consolidated affirmative defense that incorporates duress and necessity); United States v. 
Leahy, 473 F.3d 401 (1st Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292 
(11th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 540 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); 
United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 1982); 2 FED. JURY PRAC & INSTR. 
§ 35:06 (6th ed.) (2009) (same); accord United States v. Bryan, 591 F.2d 1161, 1162 (5th 
Cir. 1979) (finding the requirements of duress or necessity to include a prisoner facing a 
specific threat of bodily harm at the prison, where he has no ability to prevent threat or time 
to report threat to the court, and where there is no evidence that an innocent person is hurt 
and he immediately turns himself in upon reaching a safe position). 
94 Butler, 485 F.3d at 572 n.1 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
95 Leahy, 473 F.3d at 401. 
96 Id. at 404. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 405. 
99 Id. at 409. 
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defense and its relationship to duress and necessity.100  The court noted the 
confusion over the nomenclature surrounding these defenses and that many 
courts have avoided this problem by “lumping them” into one defense.101  
The First Circuit similarly concluded that the “ease in administration favors 
treating these . . . defenses in a federal felon-in-possession case, under a 
single, unity rubric: justification.” 102
This justification defense typically requires the following elements: 
(1) the defendant was under an unlawful and present threat of death or 
serious bodily injury, (2) he did not recklessly place himself in a situation 
which forced him to engage in the criminal conduct, (3) he had no 
reasonable alternative, and (4) there was a direct causal relationship 
between the criminal conduct and the need to avoid the threatened harm.
 
103  
These elements are very similar to the duress requirements cited above.104  
They also closely track the way federal circuits have applied the necessity 
defense (in non-felon-in-possession cases), even if these courts have used a 
different formal definition.105
V. DEPARTURES UNDER THE GUIDELINES BASED ON  
DURESS AND NECESSITY 
 
Because the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) are now 
advisory, courts are not restricted to their policy statements or their explicit 
departure grounds.106  However, courts must still look to the Guidelines and 
their policy statements for general guidance in crafting a sentence.107
 
100 Id. at 405–06. 
  In 
fact, the majority of federal circuit courts have found that a trial judge must 
101 Id. at 406. 
102 Id.  The First Circuit also included self-defense as part of this unified “justification” 
defense.  Id.; see United States v. Beasley, 346 F.3d 930, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 
that in felon-in-possession cases, the justification defense encompasses necessity, duress, 
and self-defense); United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d 322, 327 n.6 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(“[N]ecessity, justification, duress, and self-defense are interchangeably lumped together 
under the rubric of the justification defense.”). 
103 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 485 F.3d 569, 572 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 404 (1st Cir. 2007); Beasley, 346 F.3d at 933; United States v. 
Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 
1162–63 (5th Cir. 1982). 
104 See supra Part III. 
105 See supra Part II and subpart IV.A. 
106 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Lee D. Heckman, The Benefits of 
Departure Obsolescence: Achieving the Purposes of Sentencing in the Post-Booker World, 
69 OHIO ST. L. J. 149, 169–71 (2008). 
107 Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–60 (noting that under § 3553(a), courts must still consider 
the Guidelines and its policy statements); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (referencing 
the Guidelines and policy statements as factors to be considered in sentencing). 
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calculate any applicable departures under the Guidelines as part of their 
sentencing process.108
A. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF DEPARTURES 
  Accordingly, an analysis of the Guidelines and 
related case law is appropriate in understanding how federal courts 
approach duress and necessity during the sentencing phase. 
The Guidelines formally distinguish between duress and necessity as 
two separate grounds upon which courts can depart.  Under § 5K2.11, a 
court may depart downward on necessity grounds where “a defendant . . . 
commit[s] a crime in order to avoid a perceived greater harm.”109  However, 
“[w]here the interest in punishment or deterrence is not reduced, a reduction 
in sentence is not warranted.”110  For instance, a departure is not warranted 
where a defendant provides secrets to a hostile country because he believes 
that America’s policies are misdirected.111
Duress serves as a separate ground for departure.  Under § 5K2.12, a 
court may depart downward where a “defendant committed the offense 
because of serious coercion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not 
amounting to a complete defense.”
  Similar to the typical definition 
articulated by federal courts during the liability phase, the Guidelines make 
no reference to the kind of harm required to be averted.  Rather, the focus is 
on the balancing of harms and the choosing of the lesser evil. 
112  The coercion ordinarily must involve 
“a threat of physical injury, substantial damage to property or similar 
injury . . . .”113  “[P]ersonal financial difficulties and economic pressures” 
are not sufficient.114
 
108 See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 32 (1st Cir. 2006); see also 
Heckman, supra note 
  Much like the formal definition of duress articulated 
106, at 152 n.16 (“The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Six, Eighth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all require calculating applicable departures as part of 
consulting the Guidelines.”).  The majority of trial courts now use a three-part process when 
fashioning a sentence: first, a court calculates the applicable Guidelines range; next, the 
court calculates any applicable departures under the Guidelines; finally it considers all the 
§ 3553(a) factors to determine whether a variance is appropriate.  See e.g., Wallace, 461 F.3d 
at 32. 
109 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.11 (2006). 
110 Id. 
111 Id.  Section 5K2.11 also allows for a departure where the “conduct may not cause or 
threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the offense at issue.”  
Id.; see also United States v. Bayne, 103 F. App’x 710 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming downward 
departure under § 5K2.11 for possession of sawed-off shotgun where defendant did not use it 
for any unlawful purpose).  This departure ground is not relevant to this Article. 
112 § 5K2.12.  The Guidelines provide that the extent of the mitigation depends on the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s actions and the proportionality of the defendant’s actions 
to the seriousness of the coercion or duress.  Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
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by federal courts during the liability phase, the Guidelines emphasize 
physical injury as the coercive factor.  There is no reference to balancing 
harms or choosing the lesser evil. 
B. APPLICATION OF DEPARTURES BY FEDERAL CIRCUITS 
The formal definitions of necessity and duress departures track their 
counterparts at the liability phase.  The Guidelines likewise make no 
mention of the kind of harm to be averted for necessity departures nor do 
they require a balancing of harms for duress departures.  This leaves open 
the potential that these departures could also apply in very different 
circumstances.115
Federal circuits have generally approved of departures from the 
Guidelines based on necessity only in cases where serious injury was 
averted.
  However, much like during the liability phase, federal 
circuits have incorporated (as a matter of practice) both the lesser harms and 
serious injury requirements when considering the permissibility of these 
departures. 
116  For instance, the Tenth Circuit approved of a district court’s 
decision to depart on necessity grounds where a defendant illegally 
reentered the United States so that he could pay for his wife’s life-saving 
operation.117  Similarly, the First and Eleventh Circuits found departures on 
necessity grounds potentially applicable where the harm to be averted was a 
person’s physical well-being.118  Indeed, courts have disapproved of 
departures on necessity where the harm averted did not involve serious 
injury.119  For example, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a departure on this 
ground where the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of unregistered 
firearms for political reasons.120  Specifically, the defendant contended that 
he committed the “criminal act . . . to liberate the people of Cuba.”121
 
115 See infra subpart IV.A. 
  The 
116 See, e.g., United States v. Macias-Madrid, 209 F. App’x 752 (10th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Hernandez, 103 F. App’x 882 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Torres, 71 F. App’x 
103 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Carvell, 74 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Rojas, 47 F.3d 1078 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Salemi, 26 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 
1994). 
117 Macias-Madrid, 209 F. App’x at 753–54. 
118 Carvell, 74 F.3d at 12 (finding that departure on lesser harms ground was appropriate 
where defendant manufactured and used drugs to prevent the taking of his own life); Salemi, 
26 F.3d at 1087 (finding that departure on necessity ground only appropriate for kidnapping 
conviction where there was evidence that defendant’s child was in abusive environment). 
119 The Third Circuit, for example, rejected a necessity departure in a drug possession 
case where the harm to be averted was merely the failure of the defendant’s business.  
Torres, 71 F. App’x at 105. 
120 Rojas, 47 F.3d at 1082. 
121 Id. 
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court found that merely furthering a greater political good was not sufficient 
to warrant a departure under lesser harms.122  The Sixth Circuit also rejected 
a departure on necessity where the defendant illegally reentered the United 
States because of his concern for the safety of his sons.123  The defendant 
learned that his “teenage sons were getting into trouble, living on the streets 
and not attending school” and “one son . . . was sent to a foster home.”124  
The court affirmed the sentencing judge’s decision that these “harms” were 
not extreme enough to warrant a departure.125
Federal courts have entertained the use of departures based on duress 
only where the defendant’s actions were intended to avert a greater harm.
 
126  
For instance, the Seventh Circuit discussed the permissibility of a departure 
based on duress where a defendant argued that he unlawfully possessed a 
weapon because he was allegedly shot and received threats to himself and 
his family.127  Similarly, the First Circuit considered a duress departure 
where a defendant illegally withdrew money from his bank account because 
a third party threatened him and his family with physical harm if he did not 
repay his debt.128
The foregoing analysis shows that federal courts have applied duress 
and necessity in similar circumstances both during the liability and 
sentencing phases of trial.  While these defenses have different formal 
definitions, their uniform application suggests that they have more in 
common than one might think.  This lends support to the conclusion that 





123 United States v. Hernandez, 103 F. App’x 882, 883–84 (6th Cir. 2004). 
124 Id. at 883. 
125 Id. at 833–34. 
126 See e.g., United States v. Harvey, 516 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Allen, 450 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2006) (considering duress departure where defendant illegally 
possessed firearm because of physical threats to him and his girlfriend during a break-in); 
United States v. Cotto, 347 F.3d 441 (2d Cir. 2003) (considering duress departure where 
defendant was convicted of obstruction of justice because of alleged threats to her and her 
family); United States v. Sachdev, 279 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Hamilton, 
949 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1991) (considering duress departure where defendant sold drugs to 
pay off debt because of threats of harm to himself and family). 
127 Harvey, 516 F.3d at 555. 
128 Sachdev, 279 F.3d at 27. 
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VI. THE BASICS OF EXCUSE AND JUSTIFICATION 
A. A PRIMER ON DEFINING THE TERMS 
The basic concepts of excuse and justification are readily 
understandable and not particularly controversial.  Merriam-Webster 
defines “justification” as the act or process of being “just, right or 
reasonable.”129  It defines “excuse” as the act of making an apology or 
trying to remove blame from.130  These definitions elicit very different 
intuitive actions and alone suggest that a justified action is morally superior 
to or in some way preferable to an excused act.  Legal scholarship tracks 
this general sentiment.  As one notable scholar writes, a justified act is “to 
be encouraged (or at least tolerated)” whereas an excused act is “wrong and 
undesirable” though “[c]riminal liability is nonetheless inappropriate.”131  
The hallmark of a justified act is something that is desirable or something 
that benefits society.132  It is no surprise that such an action can be used to 
avoid criminal liability.  An excused act works differently.  It is harmful or 
undesirable, but at the same time can still be invoked to avoid criminal 
liability because of the specific circumstances in the case.133
 
129 MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2010).  The term “justification” is defined 
as “the act, process, or state of being justified” and the term “justified” means “to prove or 
show to be just, right, or reasonable.”  Id. 
  A robust 
understanding of these two terms would probably need to go beyond the 
aforementioned definitions.  As one scholar points out, “the concept of 
being justified is quite complex and multifarious” and “the social message 
130 Id.  The noun is defined as “the act of excusing” and the verb means “to make 
apology for” or “to try to remove blame from.”  Id. 
131 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1978) (“A justification speaks 
to the rightness of the act; an excuse, to whether the actor is accountable for a concededly 
wrongful act.”); 2 ROBINSON, supra note 1, at § 25(d); Berman, supra note 7, at 7–11; see 
Gabriel J. Chin, Unjustified: The Practical Irrelevance of the Justification/Excuse 
Distinction, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79 (2009). 
132 Chiu, supra note 7, at 1330; Milhizer, supra note 7, at 726 (“Justification defenses 
focus on the act and not the actor—they exculpate otherwise criminal conduct because it 
benefits society, or because the conduct is in some other way judged to be socially useful.”).  
But see Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal 
Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 64 (1984) 
(arguing against notion that justification implies morally right, good, or proper conduct and 
finding that such conduct may simply constitute permissible or tolerated action).   
133 See Steven J. Mulroy, The Duress Defense’s Uncharted Terrain: Applying it to 
Murder, Felony Murder, and the Mentally Retarded Defendant, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 159, 
167 (2006) (“If a defendant establishes a justification, it means that society does not 
condemn the act committed; on balance, the justice system decides that society is better off 
that the act occurred.  If a defendant establishes an excuse, society still condemns the act, but 
finds a reason why that particular defendant need not be punished—the defendant’s insanity, 
for example.”). 
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of excuse may be more varying than a universal pronouncement of being 
wrong.”134  Luckily, such a detailed understanding is not necessary here.  I 
only need to appeal to the basic intuitive135 difference between these two 
actions.  As this same scholar concludes, “despite the multiple meanings 
that may be attributed to justification and excuse, there is still undeniably a 
significant divide between the two; the substantive message of justification 
is a positive one, while the substantive message of excuse produces 
negative overtones.”136
The labels of justification and excuse should not be confused with 
legal determinations.
 
137  The classification of an act as an excuse or 
justification does not bear on how courts will analyze these defenses.  One 
scholar, for instance, may classify the defense of duress as an excuse while 
another may classify this defense as a justification.  It is a separate question 
whether the defendant has satisfied the legal elements of duress.  One may 
rightly ask then “What is the purpose of discussing excuse and justification 
if this classification does not bear on a court’s determination of criminal 
liability?”138  There are a couple of responses.  First, there is a basic desire 
in all of us to morally judge actions regardless of their legal status.  So there 
is some value in distinguishing between justification and excuse.  But this 
exercise may serve more than just intellectual curiosity.  One scholar 
explains that this exercise may serve to provide a philosophical justification 
of our criminal system—“A clear and broadly recognized distinction 
between justification and excuse, founded upon objectively true and 
immutable norms for exculpation, is necessary if a criminal law system is to 
be moral, just, and tethered to principles greater than itself.”139  Another 
scholar puts forth a more practical application, suggesting that appreciating 
this distinction would help legislators better understand the legal contours 
of affirmative defenses such as duress.140
 
134 Chiu, supra note 7, at 1332. 
 
135 I use this term to generally describe society’s moral opinion of the action in question.  
Specifically, the term encompasses whether society would consider an action right or wrong 
or someone blameworthy or not blameworthy.  This term is not intended to be utilitarian in 
nature but focuses more on principles of fairness.  See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, On 
Equality, Bias Crimes, and Just Deserts, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 237, 245 n.18 
(2000). 
136 Chiu, supra note 7 at 1332. 
137 See generally Berman, supra note 7, at 7–14 (discussing how moral determinations 
are distinct from legal determinations). 
138 See Chin, supra note 131 (suggesting that there is no practical value to distinguishing 
between excuse and justification). 
139 Milhizer, supra note 7, at 728–29. 
140 Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 1, at 950. 
2011] EXCUSING BEHAVIOR: DURESS AND NECESSITY 597 
One could write an entire article on how this distinction can inform our 
opinions about the criminal justice system or specific affirmative 
defenses.141  Fortunately, this kind of analysis is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  If these classifications are to serve such lofty purposes, scholars 
must first get the distinction right. 142  They must accurately determine on 
what basis a particular act should be classified as an excuse or justification.  
This Article shows that scholars have failed in this regard when it comes to 
the defenses of duress and necessity.  Before examining these theories, it 
makes sense to look at two affirmative defenses for which there is little 
controversy on their classification.  Most scholars consider the affirmative 
defense of self-defense as the paradigmatic justified act143 and insanity as 
the quintessential excused act.144
 
141 See generally Joshua Dressler, Some Very Modest Reflections on Excusing Criminal 
Wrongdoers, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 247 (2009). 
  Understanding the legal contours of these 
defenses will help shed light on how best to classify duress and necessity. 
142 See Berman, supra note 7, at 6 (“To be sure, so long as scholars are going to employ 
[the distinction between excuse and justification], it’s important that they get the distinction 
right.”). 
143 Marcia Baron, Justifications and Excuses, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 387, 388–89 (2004) 
(noting that self-defense unlike duress is easily classified as a justification); Enker, supra 
note 1, at 277 (“Self-defense, also called private defense, and necessity, which is essentially 
choosing the lesser evil, are justifications.”); Huigens, supra note 6, at 304 (making the same 
argument); David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, The Human Right of Self-
Defense, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 43, 153 (2007) (“[T]he great weight of international legal 
authority treats self-defense as a justification, and not as an excuse”); Schwartz, supra note 
10, at 1266 (“Self-defense, to be sure, is generally grouped with necessity as a justification, 
rather than duress as an excuse.”); Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 1, at 842 (noting that 
self-defense sits above both necessity and duress in the hierarchy of defenses).  But see 
Claire O. Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 621, 623 
(1996) (“This view of self-defense [as a justification] is so widely shared that it is espoused 
by lawyers and philosophers, rights-based theories and utilitarians alike.  In this article, 
however, I sketch a view which challenges this received wisdom, [and find that] self-defense 
should be thought of as a species of excuse.”). 
144 Baron, supra note 143, at 388–89 (noting that insanity is an excuse and excluding it 
from the list of defenses that is hard to classify); Kevin Bennardo, Of Ordinariness and 
Excuse: Heat-of-Passion and the Seven Deadly Sins, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 675 (2008) (noting 
at the beginning of article that insanity defense is the typical excused act and self-defense is 
the typical justified act); Chin, supra note 131, at 104 (finding that making legislators label 
insanity as an excuse adds nothing to the moral quality of the defense because this 
characterization is obvious); Enker, supra note 1, at 277 (noting that insanity is clearly an 
excuse whereas duress may be a justification or excuse depending upon the scope of the 
defense); Arnold H. Loewy, The Two Faces Insanity, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 513 (2009) 
(arguing that insanity is an excuse when functioning as a means to exculpate); Paul H. 
Robinson, A System of Excuses: How Criminal Law’s Excuse Defenses Do, and Don’t, Work 
Together to Exculpate Blameless (and only Blameless) Offenders, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 
259, 260 (2009) (recognizing that insanity is commonly understood as an excused act). 
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B. SELF-DEFENSE AND INSANITY AS PROTOTYPICAL JUSTIFIED AND 
EXCUSED ACTS 
The federal common law doctrine of self-defense traces its roots to 
early Supreme Court jurisprudence.  In Anderson v. United States, for 
example, the Court found this defense applicable in the context of lethal 
force where a defendant “was acting under a reasonable belief that he was 
in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm by the deceased, and that 
his act in causing death was necessary in order to avoid [this harm] which 
was apparently imminent.”145  This case involved a sailor who killed the 
first mate but claimed it was in self-defense.146
The Supreme Court did not find any error with the jury’s decision that 
the defendant was guilty of murder.
 
147  The Court explained that the 
defendant did not act in response to an imminent threat of bodily harm from 
the victim; rather, the threatened harm consisted merely of arrest and 
immediate incarceration.148
The basic elements of self-defense have not changed over the years.
 
149  
Federal courts apply the defense where a defendant’s use of force was 
reasonable and necessary to defend himself or another against imminent 
bodily harm.150
In order to make a prima-facie case of self-defense, a defendant must make an offer of 
proof as to two elements: (1) a reasonable belief that the use of force was necessary to 
defend himself or another against the immediate use of unlawful force and (2) the use 
  The Ninth Circuit provides a typical definition:  
 
145 Anderson v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 508 (1898); see Beard v. United States, 158 
U.S. 550, 559 (1895); Gourko v. United States, 153 U.S. 183, 191 (1894). 
146 Anderson, 170 U.S. at 508–09. 
147 Id. at 511; see also 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 127 (Charles E. Torcia, ed., 15th 
ed. 2010) (“A defendant may kill in self-defense when he reasonably believes that he is in 
imminent danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily harm.”). 
148 Anderson, 170 U.S. at 508–09. 
149 Defendants most likely bear the burden of proving self-defense in federal court.  See, 
e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2006); United States v. Jumah, 493 F.3d 
868, 873 n.2 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that Dixon’s discussion of burden of persuasion applied 
to other affirmative defenses like self-defense).  But see Dixon, 548 U.S. at 24 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (collecting cases from various circuits showing that Government bears the 
burden of persuasion as to this defense). 
150 See United States v. Biggs, 441 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In defining one’s 
self against an unlawful attack, a person is only justified in using such an amount force as 
may appear to him at the time necessary to accomplish that purpose.”); United States v. 
Loman, 551 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1231 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (collecting federal cases on the doctrine of self-defense); see also MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985) (“[T]he use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable 
when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of 
protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present 
occasion.”); id. at § 3.05 (applying self-defense elements to defense of another). 
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of no more force than was reasonably necessary in the circumstances.151
The Federal Jury Practice and Instructions on self-defense track these 
elements.  The instructions provide that “[u]se of force is justified when a 
person reasonably believes that it is necessary for the defense of oneself or 
another against the immediate use of unlawful force.”
 
152
Historically, the Supreme Court left the development of the insanity 
defense to federal circuit courts, which employed a variety of tests.
   
153  The 
federal landscape changed in 1984 when Congress enacted the Insanity 
Defense Reform Act (IDRA).154  The details surrounding its enactment and 
subsequent promulgation are not important for my purposes.  What matters 
is that the statute for the first time codified the insanity defense for federal 
prosecutions.155  Under the IDRA, defendants invoke the insanity defense 
where, at the time of the commission of the offense, they failed to 
appreciate the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of the action.156  It 
also explicitly provides that the defendant bears the burden of proving this 
defense.157  Federal courts continue to use the IDRA when applying the 
insanity defense.158
VII. THE MAJOR THEORIES USED TO CLASSIFY DURESS AND NECESSITY 
 
A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
Numerous elements make up a case of duress or necessity.  A common 
list might include the defendant’s state of mind and actions, the nature of 
the harm caused, the type of threat averted, and the role of other 
participants.  Any of these could be logical starting points to constructing a 
theory that classifies these situations as excused or justified acts.  The 
specific circumstances surrounding each of these components will 
obviously vary from case to case.  The federal cases cited highlight this 
 
151 Biggs, 441 F.3d at 1071. 
152 2A FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 45:19 (5th ed. 2009). 
153 See Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness 
and Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 14–40 (2007) 
(summarizing evolution of insanity defense in state and federal courts); Henry Miller, Recent 
Changes in Criminal Law: The Federal Insanity Defense, 46 LA. L. REV. 337, 349 (1985) 
(tracing the history of the insanity defense in federal courts and collecting cases on the 
variety of tests used, including the McNaughten test and the American Law Institute 
formulation). 
154 Fradella, supra note 153, at 25. 
155 Id. 
156 See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2006). 
157 See id. at. § 17(b). 
158 See, e.g., United States v. Long, 562 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2009); 1A FED. JURY PRAC. & 
INSTR. § 19.03 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing elements of insanity defense in light of IDRA). 
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point.  The type of harm to be averted, for example, could encompass the 
suffering of another,159 harm to endangered animals,160 danger of a child 
possessing a firearm,161 coercive threats in prison,162 or threats to family 
and person.163
It is important to say something about self-defense and insanity.  As 
stated earlier, these defenses are generally classified as justification and 
excuse respectively.  Thus, any criteria we use to categorize duress and 
necessity must also appropriately classify these two defenses.  If some 
theory classifies necessity as a justification but, under its own terms, also 
classifies self-defense as an excuse, we would have to reject it.  So we want 
a theory that seeks to classify all purported cases of excuse or 
justification.
  Any classification theory would have to account for all these 
scenarios.  Naturally, the theory would have to focus on the essential 
components that make up each of these fact patterns. 
164
As stated earlier, classifying cases of duress and necessity as excuses 
or justifications is separate from determining whether they are legally 
applicable.
  It would be somewhat arbitrary if one theory were used to 
classify self-defense, while a different theory were used to classify duress 
and necessity.  A unified theory would naturally be more robust, and 
ultimately more persuasive, than this kind of piecemeal approach. 
165
This does not mean that a proposed classification theory should 
entirely follow the way courts treat these defenses.  For instance, courts 
sometimes associate natural threats with necessity and manmade threats 
with duress.
  Still, it makes little sense to discuss their classification if a 
court would not find the defenses legally viable.  Imagine a defendant who 
argues self-defense when the facts clearly show an intent to physically harm 
an innocent victim.  There is no point in asking whether the defendant’s 
purported act of self-defense was justified.  His actions do not merit any 
relief from criminal liability.  So there is no justifying (or excusing) action 
and thus nothing to classify. 
166
 
159 See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 487 (2001). 
  But we would not want to rely on this factor alone when 
160 See United States v. Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2002). 
161 See United States v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d 1113, 1123 (10th Cir. 2006). 
162 See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980). 
163 See United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 803 (9th Cir. 2008). 
164 Cf. FLETCHER, supra note 131, at § 10.1.3. 
165 See supra subpart VI.A. 
166 See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409–10.  But see Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d at 1123; United States v. 
Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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trying to classify these defenses.167
That said, how federal courts have analyzed these defenses can be 
instructive to our task.  Federal circuit courts generally apply the same 
elements (whether explicitly or implicitly) when examining these defenses 
during both the liability and sentencing phases of trial.
  For one thing, the nature/manmade 
distinction does not seem to bear on how we would judge a defendant who 
invokes either of these defenses.  Just because the threat comes from nature, 
for instance, would not mean that the defendant’s behavior should be 
considered less blameworthy than if the threat comes from another person.  
In both cases, the defendant has not caused the threats, and so it is hard to 
see why this distinction would bear on his culpability.  Furthermore, this 
very crude distinction could inaccurately classify self-defense and the 
insanity defense.  Assuming defenses involving natural threats should be 
classified as justified actions, self-defense would be classified as an excuse 
because by definition it entails manmade threats.  Similarly, this theory 
would classify insanity as a justification if the relevant threats arise 
naturally.  Any classification scheme would have to do more than just 
appeal to the type of harm involved. 
168  For one specific 
crime, they have codified their analysis of duress and necessity into a single 
test.169
Before proceeding further, it is important to address the case where the 
defendant acted on a mistaken belief.  Under this scenario, the defendant 
has satisfied the legal elements of an affirmative defense but as it turns out, 
he was mistaken about the threatened harm.  Take the classic case of self-
defense.  A court may find that the defendant reasonably believed that he 
was under imminent bodily harm and find him not guilty of the related 
  While this treatment should not be dispositive, it does suggest that 
these two defenses are better classified together (as either excuses or 
justifications). 
 
167 I am not suggesting that the distinction between “manmade” and “natural” does not 
have any bearing on the legal scope of these defenses.  For instance, the Model Penal Code 
implies that duress only applies in instances involving manmade threats.  See MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.09 (1984) (requiring that the defendant was “coerced to [commit the crime] by the 
use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another . . . .”).  
But the Model Penal Code does not seem to limit necessity only to natural threats.  See 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (focusing only on the balancing of harms). 
168 See supra Parts IV and V. 
169 Federal courts have also included self-defense as part of this consolidated defense in 
felon-in-possession cases.  See supra note 102.  I am not suggesting that this means that self-
defense should be classified in the same category as necessity and duress.  For one thing, this 
consolidated defense only applies in one federal crime.  In fact, courts generally apply 
separate elements when evaluating self-defense.  See supra subpart VI.B.  Moreover, 
treatment by federal courts provides only guidance on how these defenses should be 
classified. 
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assault.  However, let us assume that as a matter of fact, the defendant was 
mistaken as to his belief of threatened harm.  The would-be perpetrator, for 
example, had a fake weapon and never intended to harm the defendant.  In 
this situation, one might argue that this act of self-defense is better 
classified as an excuse than justification.170  We do not want to privilege or 
otherwise tolerate actions that involve mistaken beliefs of threatened harm 
(even if they are reasonable).171
But this type of analysis does not end the inquiry.  For one thing, some 
may still argue that even under these circumstances, this instance of self-
defense remains a justified act.
  While the defendant should not be held 
criminally liable, his actions are wrong and, thus, should not warrant the 
label of justification. 
172  We now need a theory that explains such 
a classification.  But assuming this act is better classified as an excuse, we 
are no closer to an answer to the original question.  The purpose of this 
Article is to find criteria that accurately classify duress and necessity.  The 
problem with invoking mistaken belief as the distinguishing factor is that 
this permutation can be applied to all such affirmative defenses.173  For 
instance, the defendant may mistakenly but reasonably believe that natural 
forces made him destroy another person’s property.  As an instance of 
mistake, this would be classified as an excuse.174  The same can be said of a 
fact pattern involving a mistaken duress defense.175
 
170 See George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 553, 576 (1996). 
  We are left then with 
the somewhat uninteresting conclusion that all of these affirmative defenses 
involving mistake should be classified as excuses.  More importantly, we 
are still without an answer on how to classify duress and necessity where 
there is no mistake of fact.  For the purpose of this Article therefore, I will 
assume (unless stated otherwise) that none of the scenarios involve 
171 See Berman, supra note 7, at 38–57 (discussing the classification of defenses where 
the defendant’s action is objectively reasonable but subjectively mistaken). 
172 See Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1900–07 (1984).  See generally CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 343–
63 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) (collecting scholarly articles on whether an action 
should be classified as a justification if premised on mistaken belief).  But see Peter Westen, 
An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 25 LAW & PHIL. 289, 314–24 (2006) (arguing against 
Greenawalt). 
173 The defense of insanity by definition includes a mistaken belief because the defendant 
suffers from some mental defect that prevents him from appreciating the nature of the crime. 
174 Again, some may argue that even under these circumstances, such a defense of 
necessity is still better classified as a justified act. 
175 Peter Westen, Offences and Defences Again, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 563, 581 
(2008). 
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mistaken belief.  This way we do not muddle the issue and can simply focus 
on how best to classify the prototypical cases of duress and necessity. 
Scholars have put forth a number of theories to classify these defenses 
as excused or justified acts.  The theories typically center around the 
defendant and what he did.  They can be grouped into roughly five main 
types: the lesser-harm theory, act-versus-actor distinction, able-to-aid 
versus able-to-prevent, conduct versus decision rule, and warranted versus 
unwarranted action.176
B. LESSER-HARM THEORY 
  Each relies on unique criteria intended to provide a 
comprehensive methodology to distinguish excused from justified acts.  
Ultimately, all of them fail on their own terms to provide a consistent 
theory that accurately captures the nature of duress and necessity. 
The most widely accepted theory to distinguish an excuse from a 
justification is the lesser-harm model.177  Scholars use a number of labels to 
describe this theory, including “choice of evils,” “balance of utilities 
theory,” or “public good.”178  This theory focuses on balancing the 
threatened harm with the harm caused by the defendant.  For a defense to be 
considered a justification, “the harm caused by the defendant’s illegal act 
must be less than the harm which would have resulted had the defendant 
obeyed the law . . . .” and done nothing.179  Put another way, “[e]very 
justification defense is a statement that the defendant’s act in question was 
actually the least harmful act the defendant could have done, given the 
options in front of him or her as defined by the particular circumstances.”180
Any robust application of this theory would have to accurately gauge 





176 This is not an exhaustive list.  For instance, one scholar proposes distinguishing 
justification and excuse by reference to their historical origins.  See Horowitz, supra note 
  For instance, property (regardless of how much is 
involved) can always be destroyed to save even one innocent life.  We value 
9.  
However, as one critic points out, laws have changed over time (the scholar initially 
proposed his theory in 1986) and the notion of justification has expanded in criminal law 
thereby lessening the value of this methodology.  See Linda A. Malone, Is There Really a 
Difference Between Justification and Excuse, or Did We Academics Make It Up?, 42 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 321, 323 (2009). 
177 See generally FLETCHER, supra note 131, at § 10.2; Chiu, supra note 7, at 1328; 
Dressler, supra note 1, at 1350–52; Milhizer, supra note 7, at 844; Mulroy, supra note 133, 
at 166–67. 
178 Chiu, supra note 7, at 1328. 
179 Mulroy, supra note 133, at 166. 
180 Chiu, supra note 7, at 1328. 
181 Milhizer, supra note 7, at 844. 
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the sanctity of life, which is “qualitatively superior to property rights.”182  
To be effective, this theory must also not be construed as purely utilitarian.  
There are some interests that are “always morally superior to others.”183  
For example, an action where a few lives are sacrificed to save many would 
probably not be classified as a justification because such a calculation fails 
to recognize the unquantifiable nature of human life.184
It should come as no surprise that this theory would classify necessity 
as a justification.
 
185  The lesser-evil requirement is a formal element of the 
defense. 186  Take the simple case of destroying a dike to save more valuable 
property from flooding.  By opting to commit the illegal act (destruction of 
the dike), the defendant causes less harm than if he did nothing (destruction 
of more valuable property by flooding).  So this case of necessity would be 
classified as a justified act.  The same analysis applies in a case where the 
defendant provides marijuana to severely ill patients in violation of the 
federal drug laws.187
The case of duress is more complicated.  The formal definition does 
not include a lesser-evil element.
  Under the lesser-evil theory, this action would also be 
considered a justification.  The threatened harm (illness of patients) was 
greater than the harm caused (violation of drug laws). 
188  So we can imagine a scenario where 
the harm caused is greater than the threatened harm.  For instance, someone 
may threaten the defendant with physical harm unless the defendant 
assaults an innocent person.  Should the defendant harm the innocent 
person and the court finds a proper application of duress, the defendant’s 
action would fail the lesser-harm test and be considered an excuse.189  But 
as we have seen, federal courts have (tacitly) applied the lesser-harm 
principle when entertaining the application of duress.190
 
182 Id. 
  It is likely then 
that most (if not all) instances of duress in federal court would satisfy the 
lesser-evil theory and be classified as justifications.  Take, for example, the 
183 Id. at 845. 
184 Id. 
185 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 1, at § 124 (finding that the “choice of evils” is 
synonymous with “necessity” defense). 
186 See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980). 
187 See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
188 See supra Part III. 
189 I assume that the threatened harm (e.g., seriously maiming defendant) is greater than 
the harm caused by the defendant (e.g., breaking an innocent person’s legs).  But the degree 
of the physical harm caused in comparison to the threatened physical harm may not matter 
for a proper application of the lesser harm theory.  As I have said, this theory is not purely 
utilitarian.  Hurting an innocent person would automatically constitute the greater harm 
because of the unquantifiable nature of human life. 
190 See supra subpart IV.A. 
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case of a defendant who deals drugs to avoid threats of physical harm by 
the mafia.191  Under a specific set of conditions, most of us would say that 
the defendant causes the lesser harm.  Let us assume that the defendant only 
participates in one drug transaction with a government informant so there is 
no harm to others resulting from the drug deal.  Because the defendant 
avoids greater harm to his person and family by committing the drug 
violation, under the lesser-harm principle, he commits a justified action.192
There is nothing particularly problematic about certain cases of duress 
being classified as justifications and others as excuses.
 
193  Nevertheless, 
intuitively it is hard to see why we would judge the defendants differently 
in each of these two cases.  Assume in one case, someone physically 
threatens the defendant unless the defendant hurts an innocent person, and 
in another case, the same person threatens the defendant with the same 
harm unless he destroys this innocent person’s property.  Under the lesser-
harm theory, the first would be classified as an excuse (not choosing the 
lesser evil) and the second a justification (choosing the lesser evil).  It is 
easy to see why assaulting an innocent person would be the wrong thing to 
do.  So classifying this situation as an excuse makes sense.  But it is not 
clear that the case of a defendant destroying an innocent person’s property 
to avoid physical harm warrants the label justification.  Are we suggesting 
that this behavior constitutes the right action—something to be tolerated or 
even encouraged?  On the one hand, the defendant avoids grievous bodily 
harm, which might be worth destroying property (at least to him).  But what 
about the harm to the innocent victim?  Maybe destroying his property will 
have adverse financial consequences for his family.  This financial harm 
may not constitute the “greater harm,” but this would hardly give the owner 
and his family much comfort.  The fact remains that the defendant is 
destroying the property of an innocent person who did nothing wrong.194
 
191 See United States v. Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705, 712 (7th Cir. 2009). 
  
On the justification/excuse hierarchy, the defendant’s action seems to be 
closer to an excuse—wrongful conduct that we excuse because of the 
unlawful threats facing the defendant. 
192 See generally Dressler, supra note 1, at 1350–51 (discussing circumstances under 
which duress can be considered a justification); Jens David Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 193, 220 (2010) (same). 
193 Dressler, supra note 1, at 1350–51 (noting that situations of duress can be classified 
as justifications and excuses). 
194 The same analysis applies in a case of necessity, where the defendant destroys a dike 
that floods an innocent person’s property (the lesser harm) to save more valuable property 
from flooding (the greater harm). 
606 MONU BEDI [Vol. 101 
Another problem with the lesser-harm theory is that it fails to properly 
account for situations where the harms are equal.195  At first glance, this 
may not seem to pose a problem.  Take the case where the destruction of the 
dike (and the resulting damage to other property) causes the same amount 
of damage as the flooding of the property in question.  This situation simply 
would be classified as an excuse because the defendant did not choose the 
lesser harm.196  The case of self-defense presents a more troubling 
counterexample.  Imagine an instance of self-defense where a defendant 
physically assaults an aggressor in the same way that the aggressor 
threatened him (e.g., the aggressor threatens the defendant with a punch in a 
face and the defendant responds in kind to defend himself).  Here, the harm 
caused to the aggressor (or victim)197
To avoid this counterintuitive conclusion, one might appeal to another 
theory that somehow accounts for these difficult scenarios.  One prominent 
scholar of the lesser-harm model makes the following addendum: “[W]hen 
the harm is inevitable and will be of equal severity regardless of who 
suffers it, then distribute it to the party who culpably caused the harm to be 
inevitable.”
 is equal to the threatened harm.  What 
would the lesser-harm theory make of this situation?  It seems that such a 
situation would be classified as an excuse.  The defendant does not choose 
the lesser harm.  Even more troubling is the case where the harm caused is 
greater than the harm threatened.  Suppose two perpetrators threaten to 
physically harm the defendant who is then forced to assault both of them in 
self-defense.  Because the defendant’s actions cause greater harm (two 
individuals getting hurt versus one person getting hurt), the lesser-harm 
theory would classify this as an excuse.  But most of us would agree that in 
both these instances of self-defense, the defendant’s actions are justified. 
198
 
195 See generally Dressler, supra note 
  But this self-serving solution is hardly satisfying.  For one 
thing, it does not explain how to deal with an instance of self-defense where 
the harm caused is greater than the threatened harm.  This addendum does 
not apply and so such a scenario would still be classified as an excuse under 
the lesser-harm model.  One way to avoid this problem would be to appeal 
to a theory that focuses on the value of the aggressor’s life.  Such a theory 
would discount the aggressor’s life because of his provoking actions, thus 
1, at 1352–53 (discussing how the lesser-harm 
theory fails to account for situations where the harm is equal). 
196 This kind of case is unlikely because federal courts employ (formally or as a practical 
matter) a lesser-evil requirement when examining duress and necessity. 
197 It might seem odd to call the attacker the victim given the connotation of the term.  
However, I use the term “victim” simply to mean the person who suffers the harm. 
198 Chiu, supra note 7, at 1329. 
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reducing the amount of harm the defendant causes.199
But the more fundamental problem with both these theories is that they 
have moved away from a true balancing of harms.  Instead, they focus on 
the victim’s role in the crime as a proxy for classifying the action.  In the 
one, the blame has shifted to the victim because of his actions and in the 
other, the value of the victim’s life has been reduced because of his 
conduct.  This begs the question why we would not focus on the victim’s 
culpability in the first place.  This may avoid the need for constructing 
supplemental ad hoc criteria to explain difficult scenarios.  As I will show, 
focusing on the victim from the beginning provides the better and more 
comprehensive theory of distinguishing a justification from an excuse. 
  This theory would 
explain self-defense situations where the threatened harm is seemingly 
equal or less than the harm caused.  Here, the defendant actually chooses 
the lesser harm because the victim’s life counts less on account of his 
provoking actions. 
C. THE ACT-VERSUS-ACTOR DISTINCTION  
AND DISABLING CONDITIONS 
Another way to distinguish excused from justified acts relies on the 
actor/act distinction and the presence of a disabling condition. 200  “In 
determining whether conduct is justified, the focus is on the act, not the 
actor[;]” but excuses “focus . . .  on the actor.”201  In this way, “[e]xcuses 
do not destroy blame . . . rather they shift it from the actor to the excusing 
conditions.”202  This excusing condition (i.e. that which makes this action 
an excuse) hinges on some disability suffered by the defendant at the time 
of the offense.203  Put otherwise, “[t]he disability can arise from a number 
of sources, both internal and external to the actor, and may be temporary or 
permanent in nature.”204
It is easy to see how insanity serves as the prototypical example of a 
disabling condition.  Here, the actor suffers from an internal mental 
 
 
199 Stuart P. Green, Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly 
Force in Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 19 (1999). 
200 See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 7, at 1330–31; Eugene R. Milhizer, Group Status and 
Criminal Defenses: Logical Relationship or Marriage of Convenience?, 71 MO. L. REV. 547, 
568–70 (2006); Christopher D. Moore, The Elusive Foundation of the Entrapment Defense, 
89 NW. U. L. REV. 1151, 1179–82 (1995); Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A 
Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 221–29 (1982). 
201 Chiu, supra note 7, at 1330–31. (citing 1 ROBINSON, supra note 1, at § 25(d) at 100–
01). 
202 Id. 
203 Robinson, supra note 200, at 221. 
204 Milhizer, supra note 7, at 817. 
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condition that impacts his understanding of the offense.205  Because of this 
condition, we excuse the actor’s conduct.  The case of duress is slightly 
different.  Here, the defendant “perceives the conduct accurately and fully, 
understands its physical consequences, and knows its wrongfulness or 
criminality.”206  The defendant still suffers from a disabling condition.  But 
this time, the disability stems from outside threats, which prevent him from 
having a fair opportunity to obey the law.207
The problem with this theory is its underlying premise.  What 
constitutes a “fair opportunity” under this principle?  We are always making 
choices on whether to obey the laws and frequently dealing with pressure 
(in one form or another) from outside sources.  It is not clear how such 
pressure constitutes a disability.  A successful case of duress means that the 
court has found the defendant’s actions reasonable given the circumstances.  
His actions are the result of weighing options and intentionally choosing 
one alterative.
 
208  Perhaps more striking is why anyone would place this 
actor in the same category as a defendant who committed the same drug 
violation because of a mental defect like insanity.  As one critic of this 
theory points out, unlike insanity, duress constitutes “actions that actors 
deliberately undertake to achieve conscious ends.”209
More troubling is the fact that this theory classifies both necessity and 
self-defense as justifications presumably because these defendants do not 
suffer from any disabling condition.  But it is hard to see what makes these 
two defenses different from duress.  Like duress, the cases of necessity and 
self-defense also involve external threats of extreme pressure that force 
defendants to violate the law.  These defendants are also deprived of a “fair 
opportunity” to obey the law.  They do not have the luxury of following the 
law free of external pressure or coercion.  More to the point, what exactly is 
the nature of this so-called lack of fair opportunity that applies in cases of 
duress but not in cases of necessity or self-defense?  Indeed, there is no 
reason to think that only the defendant under duress has been unduly 
  This is not to suggest 
that both insanity and duress cannot be classified as excused acts (in fact, 
this is what I will argue).  But such a theory cannot rely on a purportedly 
shared disabling condition.   
 
205 See Robinson, supra note 200, at 222–25. 
206 Id. at 222. 
207 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 1, at § 177(c); Dressler, supra note 1, at 1365–66; 
Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1698–1700 (2005); Milhizer, 
supra note 200, at 569 (noting that with duress the disabling condition constitutes external 
threats); Robinson, supra note 200, at 225 (“[In the case of duress], [h]e is exculpated 
because he lacks the capacity to control his conduct”). 
208 Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 1, at 903. 
209 Id. at 902. 
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pressured or coerced into acting.210
D. ABLE-TO-AID VERSUS ABLE-TO-PREVENT 
  Any so-called disabling condition or 
unfair coercion would seem to apply (or not apply) equally to cases of 
necessity and self-defense. 
Another theory used to distinguish justified from excused acts focuses 
on the distinction between a third party being able to aid or prevent the 
defendant from committing the crime.211  Here, the idea is that a justified 
act may be encouraged and not stopped while its excused counterpart may 
be stopped but not encouraged.212
The problem with this theory is that it assumes that the third party 
possesses certain knowledge.  However, this individual may know more or 
less than the defendant, thus altering the able-to-aid versus able-to-prevent 
calculus above.
  Take the classic self-defense scenario.  A 
proponent of this theory would argue that a third party should not stop the 
defendant from taking action but such a party can help the defendant in 
fending off the attack.  For example, the third party could provide the 
defendant with a weapon, assuming that the defendant’s actions still make 
out a viable claim of self-defense.  So the instant case of self-defense would 
be a justified act.  The defense of insanity elicits the opposite reaction.  
Here, a third party should be prohibited from aiding or helping this 
defendant commit the crime.  Because of his mental defect, the defendant is 
not thinking clearly and his actions are not reasonable.  A third party could 
prevent this defendant from committing the crime.  So this case of insanity 
would constitute an excused act. 
213  For example, in the self-defense scenario, the third party 
may know that he could simply grab the wrists of both individuals thereby 
diffusing the entire situation.214
 
210 Robinson, a proponent of this theory, acknowledges that “some necessity statutes 
provide[] the necessity defense in cases where the defendant acted under the ‘[p]ressure of 
natural physical forces,’ suggesting an excuse rationale for an otherwise justification-based 
defense.”  Robinson, supra note 
  Would we still want to say that this person 
should aid the defendant in attacking his perpetrator, possibly providing 
him a weapon?  In fact, it seems that the third party—given his unique 
knowledge—should prevent the defendant from committing the crime 
200, at 235 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.47 (West 1958)). 
211 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 7, at 62–64; Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: 
Implications Beyond the Justification-Excuse Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1289 (1986); 
Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law:  A 
Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 95–97 (1984); Kent 
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 
1900, 1924 (1984). 
212 See Berman, supra note 7, at 62. 
213 See id. at 63; Greenawalt, supra note 211, at 1924. 
214 Greenawalt, supra note 211, at 1924. 
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rather than help him.  This reasoning leads to the counterintuitive 
conclusion that this instance of self-defense is better understood as an 
excuse.   
A similar problem exists with the insanity scenario.  Assume that the 
third party does not realize that the defendant is insane and believes his 
assault against the victim constitutes an instance of self-defense.  Here, the 
third party—given his lack of knowledge of the situation—may think he is 
doing the right thing by assisting the defendant.  This leads to the odd 
conclusion that such a case of insanity would be a justified act.  The 
analysis of the cases of duress and necessity fares no better.  Take the 
simple case of a defendant destroying a dike to save more valuable property 
from flooding.  Should a third party aid the defendant in this destruction?  
Again, an answer would depend on the idiosyncratic perspective of the third 
party.  Maybe the third party does not realize what property is more 
valuable.  Or perhaps he has a vested interest in the property being 
protected by the dike.  Having these perspectives will make him less likely 
to help the defendant and more likely to thwart the defendant’s efforts. 
Maybe the theory is intended to work on a more conceptual level.  
Understood in this way, it is not important what a third party would actually 
do in the circumstances at hand.  We are not analyzing the issue from his 
personal perspective and so his specific knowledge is not relevant.  Rather, 
we focus on the situation from hindsight and ask whether a hypothetical 
third party with the same knowledge as the defendant should be able to aid 
or prevent the crime.  If such a person should be able to help the defendant 
then the act is a justification, and if the person should stop the defendant, 
the act is better understood as an excuse.  While this conceptual approach 
certainly avoids the problems cited above, it now becomes too abstract to 
serve as an effective way to classify these defenses.215
 
215 Berman appears to make a similar point.  See Berman, supra note 
  The problem is not 
apparent when examining self-defense and insanity.  These are easy 
defenses to classify and so the theory works.  For example, no one would 
disagree that in hindsight a third party with the same knowledge as the 
defendant should help him fend off an attacker.  But the cases of duress and 
necessity are more complicated.  Take again the example of destroying a 
dike to save more valuable land.  Merely appealing to a third party (with 
equivalent knowledge as the defendant) does not help classify this action.  
One person could say that this third party should help the defendant 
whereas another might say that this person should prevent the defendant 
from acting.  This will depend on whether one sees this act as an excuse or 
a justification.  Either way, the insertion of a third party and their ability to 
7, at 63. 
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aid/prevent does not constitute this difference; it merely follows from it.216  
The problem is that once the third party is imputed with the same 
knowledge as the defendant, this device ceases to serve as an effective 
distinguishing tool.  We are still left without an answer as to why this action 
of destroying a dike to save more valuable land is better understand as an 
excuse or justification.217
E. CONDUCT VERSUS DECISION RULES 
 
A more theoretical approach to distinguishing justification from 
excuse focuses on the difference between conduct and decision rules.218  
Conduct rules are meant to be a publicly announced norm that individuals 
are encouraged to follow.219  These rules are addressed to ordinary citizens 
and concern what conduct is and is not permitted.220  When individuals 
conform their behavior to these public norms or conduct rules, their actions 
are considered justifications.221  A decision rule on the other hand is a norm 
that is not publicly announced but is followed by officials after the fact in 
deciding specific cases.222  This would include judges exercising their 
authority to find a defendant not culpable223 or state officials exercising 
their decisionmaking power over citizens.224  The point here is that these 
rules are not actively promoted to society at large.  Because these rules are 
not publicly promoted ex ante but rather applied individually ex post, 
actions based on decision rules would be considered excuses.225
Self-defense is a quintessential conduct rule and thus properly 




216 The same problem exists with a case of destroying a dike because of physical threats 
(a case of duress).  Again, the addition of a third party does not explain why this should be 
classified as an excuse or justification. 
  We want to publicly promote a rule that 
217 For instance, the lesser harm theory does provide such an explanation, but as I show, 
it fails to accurately reflect our intuitions on these cases.  See supra subpart VII.B. 
218 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 7, at 32–37; Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and 
Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984); 
Enker, supra note 1, at 289–90; Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 
117 YALE L.J. 1070, 1095–97 (2008); see also Kyron Huigens, Duress Is Never a Conduct 
Rule, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 172, at  3–28. 
219 Berman, supra note 7, at 32–33. 
220 Thorburn, supra note 218, at 1095. 
221 Berman, supra note 7, at 32. 
222 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 218, at 633. 
223 Berman, supra note 7, at 32–33. 
224 Thorburn, supra note 218, at 1095. 
225 Berman, supra note 7, at 32–33 (finding that duress functions as a decision rule while 
necessity functions as a conduct rule). 
226 Id. 
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declares someone can physically harm another to protect himself from 
imminent and unprovoked use of force against him.227  On the other hand, 
the defense of insanity is more appropriately considered a decision rule—
something applied by judges during trial—and thus classified as an 
excuse.228  We do not want to publicly promulgate a rule that says, “Do not 
punish someone who is insane.”229
The central problem with this theory is agreeing on whether an action 
is a conduct rule or decision rule.  Insanity and self-defense are seemingly 
easy cases.  But take the conventionally understood case of duress where a 
defendant destroys property because of physical threats to his person.  It is 
not clear whether this should be a conduct rule or a decision rule.
  Presumably, this may promote unlawful 
conduct by individuals who may believe (incorrectly) that they suffer from 
some mental impairment. 
230
The problem with the conduct/decision rule calculus becomes more 
apparent if we imagine a duress scenario where the defendant chooses the 
greater harm.  Suppose the defendant assaults an innocent person because of 
similar threats from a third party.  Do we want to promote the idea of 
harming others when confronted with similar threats by a third party? 
Probably not.  This would suggest that such conduct follows a decision rule.  
But on basis do we make this assessment?  Again, it seems that a different 
rule like the lesser-harm principle is doing the work.
  On the 
one hand, we may want to promote the norm that individuals can damage 
property to avoid threats of violence, thus classifying this case as a 
justification.  But others may argue that we should not publically promote 
the destruction of an innocent person’s property.  Such action is better 
understood as a decision rule and thus classified as an excuse.  But on what 
basis are these assessments being made?  For example, proponents of 
calling this act a conduct rule are probably appealing to some principle such 
as preserving life is more valuable than preserving property.  But this seems 




  The 
conduct/decision rule distinction does not itself provide an answer.  The 
same issue persists in situations involving the traditional case of necessity.  
Take the case of a defendant destroying a dike to save more valuable 
property from flooding.  Again, do we want to publically promote the 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 See Huigens, supra note 218, at 12–13 (arguing that duress is never a conduct rule but 
always a decision rule). 
231 Proponents of the conduct/decision theory squarely find that such actions fall within a 
society’s decision rules because the defendant did not choose the lesser harm.  See Dan-
Cohen, supra note 218, at 633–37. 
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destruction of an innocent person’s property even if this particular instance 
would result in saving more valuable land?  Or does this action better fall 
within the decision rule system?  The conduct/decision rule divide does not 
provide an obvious answer.  
This theory ultimately suffers the same fate as the able to aid/prevent 
concept.  It merely follows the excuse/justification binary distinction 
without answering what constitutes the difference.  Whether one classifies 
the destruction of the dike as a conduct rule or a decision rule will depend 
on whether one sees this as an excuse or justification.  No one would 
disagree that a justified action is something we want to publically 
encourage as the right behavior.  Similarly, no one would disagree that an 
excused action should not be publically announced or promoted and should 
be employed only by judges at trial.  But we still need a theory that explains 
why one action is better understood as a decision rule (and thus as an 
excuse) instead of a conduct rule (and thus as a justification).232
Even on its own terms, the conduct/decision rule distinction does not 
cleanly map onto the justification and excuse dichotomy.  Public policy 
may dictate that an action, while considered a justification, is better 
classified as a decision rule.
   
233  Take, for example, the case of a prisoner 
who escapes from jail because of life threatening conditions.234  We may 
think that the prisoner did what he should have done (i.e., followed a public 
norm regarding preserving one’s life) and thus deem this action a 
justification.  Still, we may not want to publicize this event.  We do not 
want other prisoners to know about this defendant’s exculpation because 
some might try to escape no matter what they believe the relevant conduct 
rule provides.  In short, we risk encouraging prisoners to escape absent life-
threatening situations.  So this action—while classified as justification—
falls under the rubric of a decision rule.235
Perhaps this scenario is not a real counterexample; rather it only 
suggests we need to reexamine the conduct/decision rule calculus when 
dealing with prison escapes prompted by life threatening conditions.  If we 
  But now the question remains 
why this case should be classified as a justification.  Appealing to the 
decision/conduct rule dichotomy does not provide an answer. 
 
232 Berman makes a similar point.  See Berman, supra note 7, at 38 (“Another way to 
capture this point is that a justification exists within the conduct rules, while an excuse exists 
within the decision rules.  Unfortunately, this way of putting things provides little guidance 
in determining whether any given defense is a justification or an excuse.”). 
233 See id. at 35.  In fact, Dan-Cohen, the originator of the conduct/decision rule 
distinction, acknowledges that at least for cases of necessity, such actions can fall into both 
conduct and decision rules.  Dan-Cohen, supra note 218, at 637–38. 
234 See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). 
235 See Berman, supra note 7, at 35. 
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think that this type of prison escape will indeed increase inappropriate 
prison escapes, we may simply say that the action should not be labeled a 
justification in any setting.  This escape squarely follows a decision rule—
excused conduct that only a judge should administer at trial.  Alternatively, 
if we think this escape will not increase inappropriate prison breaks and in 
fact encourage better prison conditions, we may label the action as 
following a conduct rule—justified conduct that should be publically 
promoted.  But now we are back to the original question of how we decide 
which “rule” better captures this action?  If we use utilitarian principles, we 
necessarily have to rely on some empirical data.  It certainly will not be 
enough to say that I believe such escapes will better prisons conditions or 
instead increase inappropriate escapes.  This cost–benefit analysis project 
seems practically difficult to conduct, especially considering we would have 
to apply it to all the various acts of duress and necessity.  Practicality aside, 
there is a deeper problem with this approach.  Such an enterprise could find 
that the public promotion of self-defense will increase inappropriate attacks 
on others.  This cost–benefit analysis would thus lead to the counterintuitive 
conclusion that the act of self-defense should be classified as a decision 
rule. 
The conduct/decision fails as a persuasive methodology to distinguish 
excuse from justification.  Either the calculus is applied ex ante without the 
benefit of empirical guidance—in which case, it does not sufficiently 
explain a justification from an excuse—or applied ex post using a utilitarian 
calculus—in which case it may end up classifying a clear case of a 
justification as part of a decision rule. 
F. WARRANTED ACTIONS VERSUS UNWARRANTED BUT NOT 
BLAMEWORTHY ACTIONS 
Another prominent theory used to distinguish justifications from 
excuses centers on actions that are warranted and those that are unwarranted 
but not blameworthy.236  A justified act would naturally be a warranted 
action whereas an excused act would be an unwarranted action in which the 
defendant is held not blameworthy.237  A warranted action is simply the 
morally appropriate action or the one based on good reasons at the time.238
 
236 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (1986); Horowitz, supra note 
  
An unwarranted action is considered wrong, though we find the defendant 
9, at 109–10; Heidi M. Hurd, 
Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 
1552–53 (1999) (arguing against Greenawalt’s warranted/unwarranted distinction); Malone, 
supra note 176, at  321–22. 
237 See Greenawalt, supra note 236, at 91. 
238 Id. 
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not blameworthy based on the specific circumstances.239  This dichotomy 
seems to track the definitions of excuse and justification outlined earlier.240  
However, the lack of any further specificity is intentional.  As the main 
proponent of this theory explains, “The price of much greater rigor in the 
law would be to press concepts beyond their natural capacity, to generate 
avoidable disagreements or submerge controversies with misleading 
labels.”241
This bare bones approach has a certain appeal.  It sheds potentially 
cumbersome constructs and conditions in favor of a simple, more intuitive 
theory.  Certainly, cases of self-defense and insanity would be easy to 
classify using this model.  A defendant’s physical assault of a provoking 
victim is surely a warranted action.  On the other hand, a defendant hurting 
someone based upon some mental defect (and not in response to an attack) 
would be unwarranted, but we would find the defendant non-blameworthy 
because of his insanity. 
 
But this theory—like its counterparts described above—stumbles when 
it comes to harder cases involving duress and necessity.  Again, it may track 
our intuitions on excused and justified acts, but it fails to explain the 
difference.  Is destroying a person’s property to save more valuable 
property a warranted or unwarranted action?  This will naturally depend on 
whether one classifies this as an excuse or justification.  But without this 
determination, it is hard to see how merely appealing to the 
unwarranted/warranted dichotomy does the job.242
 
239 Id. 
  One person may think 
that this kind of action is done for a good reason and thus justified; another 
may find that destruction of an innocent person’s property is not warranted 
though the defendant should not be held responsible.  The same problem 
persists in a case of duress.  Take the case of the defendant who deals drugs 
in response to physical threats to person and family.  Avoiding physical 
harm may seem like the proper course of action, but one can reasonably 
argue that this action is unwarranted.  Dealing drugs is never appropriate 
and should not be tolerated, though the defendant in this instance should not 
be held culpable.  The point here is that simply appealing to the 
unwarranted/warranted dichotomy does not answer our inquiry.  Something 
more is necessary (e.g., the lesser-harm principle) to explain why these 
actions are better understood as excuses (or justifications).  Intuitive appeal 
is certainly important.  But it cannot stand alone as a means to classify these 
240 See supra subpart VI.A. 
241 See Greenawalt, supra note 211, at 1904. 
242 See Horowitz, supra note 9, at 110 (arguing that the term “warranted” is ambiguous 
when it comes to classifying something as an excuse or justification). 
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situations.  We need a theory that goes further by positing some affirmative 
classification principle. 
VIII. FOCUSING ON THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM TO CLASSIFY  
DURESS AND NECESSITY 
A. THE VICTIM AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 
It is perhaps not surprising that criminal theorists have not focused on 
the victim when analyzing cases of excuse and justification.  Indeed, a 
commonly held belief in our legal system is that the victim is not to blame 
for a defendant’s action.  Who the victim is ought to be irrelevant in 
determining whether the alleged criminal acted badly. 
In adjudicating guilt and doling out punishment, the criminal law 
explicitly seeks to ascertain the criminal’s culpability.  Focus is always on 
the defendant and what he does.  As one scholar explains, “the theory of 
criminal law has developed without paying much attention to the place of 
victims in the analysis of responsibility or in the rationale for 
punishment.”243  One criminal casebook, for instance, separates the 
“elements of just punishment” into discussions of culpability, 
proportionality, and legality that look only to the alleged criminal but not 
his victim.244  In this way, the underlying rationale of determining guilt or 
assigning punishment is to evaluate the individual who stands accused.  
After all, the conventional reasons for punishment—deterrence, retribution, 
and rehabilitation—concern only criminals (or potential criminals) and their 
blameworthiness.245
Only a few scholars have examined the victim in the context of 
adjudicating criminal responsibility and imposing punishment.
 
246  One 
scholar, Vera Bergelson, recently published a book in an attempt to provide 
a comprehensive theory on a victim’s role in the criminal act.247
 
243 George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 51, 51 (1999); see also Robert Mosteller & H. Jefferson Powell, With Disdain for 
the Constitutional Craft: The Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment, 78 N.C. L. REV. 371 
(2000) (arguing against increased victim’s rights in the criminal process). 
  She argues 
that when determining a defendant’s criminal liability, courts should take 
244 SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:  
CASES AND MATERIALS ch.3 (8th ed. 2007). 
245 See, e.g., Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a 
Justification for Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 109, 119–23 (2010) 
(analyzing the historical reasons for punishment including, among other things, deterrence, 
retribution, and rehabilitation). 
246 See VERA BERGELSON, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND VICTIMS’ WRONGS: COMPARATIVE 
LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW 3 n.13 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2009) (collecting citations). 
247 See id. at 1–5. 
2011] EXCUSING BEHAVIOR: DURESS AND NECESSITY 617 
into account whether the victim was in any way culpable for the defendant’s 
actions.  She frames her argument in terms of the principle of the 
conditionality of rights.248  Under this principle, a victim may lose (or 
lessen) his right not to be harmed because of his own conduct.  If that 
happens, the defendant ought not to be held criminally accountable or his 
punishment should be reduced.249  A victim may lose his rights 
voluntarily—a case where the victim consents to the defendant’s actions—
or involuntarily—a case where the victim attacks the defendant.250  She 
goes on to argue that jurors should be instructed on this comparative 
culpability defense when imposing criminal liability.251
Her argument for why we should focus on the victim in the first place 
is multifaceted, and I will not do it justice here.  Instead, I highlight two 
reasons she gives for focusing on the victim.  First and probably most 
important, she appeals to the principle of fairness, explaining that a 
defendant’s punishment should reflect the amount of harm he caused 
relative to other participants.
 
252  In this way, if the victim is responsible for 
a part of that harm, the defendant’s resulting liability should be reduced 
accordingly.  This sounds right.  Most of us would agree that a defendant is 
less culpable for an offense where the victim was partly to blame.  Indeed, 
federal courts can reduce defendants’ sentences in situations where the 
victim provoked the commission of the offense.253  Bergelson also appeals 
to the need for internal consistency within various types of law.254  If the 
victim’s role is relevant for one offense, it should be equally relevant for 
other offenses.  She focuses her discussion on tort law, where she finds 
precedence for her comparative analysis.  In this area of law, the actions of 
the victim are uniformly considered, and it is commonplace for courts to 
allocate responsibility between the tortfeasor and victim when awarding 
damages.255
Whether and to what extent courts should take into account a victim’s 
culpability during trial is beyond the scope of this Article.  My undertaking 
 
 
248 See id. at 61–62, 161–63. 
249 See id. at 89–90, 123. 
250 See id. at 123. 
251 See id. at 155–57.  Bergelson ultimately advocates for an affirmative defense of 
comparative liability that defendants can use to mitigate their culpability.  See id. at 157–60. 
252 See id. at 36–44. 
253 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (2003) (“If the victim’s wrongful 
conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior, the court may reduce 
the sentence below the guideline range to reflect the nature and circumstances of the 
offense.”). 
254 See BERGELSON, supra note 246, at 44–45. 
255 See id. at 52–56. 
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is not strictly legal in nature.  I am not critiquing how courts have analyzed 
the affirmative defenses of duress and necessity when imposing liability or 
punishment.256
Bergelson does not attempt to use her victim-based theory to classify 
duress and necessity as excused or justified acts.  In fact, her analysis of 
duress as an excuse and necessity as a justification tracks that of most 
scholars.
  Rather, the purpose of the Article is to propose a better way 
to classify these defenses after the trial has concluded and the defendant has 
been found not guilty.  Here, relying on the victim’s role in the crime 
provides a more intuitive and consistent approach. 
257
References to the victim are not completely absent from the 
excuse/justification jurisprudence.  Scholars, including Bergelson, have 
relied on the role of the victim when analyzing self-defense as a 
justification.
  Still, her focus on the culpability of the victim and the reasons 
for it underscores the analysis here. 
258  A common approach is the moral forfeiture argument,259 
which is similar to Bergelson’s principle of the conditionality of rights.260  
The basic thrust of this theory is that the victim loses or forfeits his right not 
to be physically harmed because of his actions.261
B. THE BASIC ARGUMENT 
  This makes the 
defendant’s resulting assault of the victim a justified action.  Focusing on 
the victim’s actions in this way sounds right.  The victim forces the 
defendant’s act of self-defense.  Interestingly, theorists have not broadened 
their analysis of the victim’s role in an attempt to classify other affirmative 
defenses such as duress or necessity.  My theory hopes to do just that. 
Labeling the defendant’s conduct an excuse or justification means that 
he already has been found not guilty.  His intent and actions were no doubt 
relevant at trial and in the resulting success of his affirmative defense.  By 
 
256 Quite the contrary, the way federal courts have analyzed these defenses bolsters my 
contention that duress and necessity should be classified together. 
257 See BERGELSON, supra note 246, at 31–32 (classifying necessity as a justification 
defense because it involves choosing the lesser evil but classifying duress as an excuse 
because it focuses on the mental adequacy of the defendant). 
258 See id. at 71–77; see also Green, supra note 199, at 19; Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse 
of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 
AM. U. L. REV. 11, 48–49 (1986). 
259 See, e.g., Green, supra note 199, at 19; Rosen, supra note 258, at 48–49. 
260 See BERGELSON, supra note 246, at 91–92, 105–09. 
261 See id. at 91.  A related theory focuses on a defendant’s natural right to protect 
himself when under attack.  See generally Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Self-Defense and the 
State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 455–56 (2008).  These approaches are similar to the victim 
based add on theory described supra subpart VII.B. 
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and large, though, he suffers no lingering consequences from the state and 
continues his life in the same way. 
The victim cannot say the same thing.  He suffered harm as a result of 
the defendant’s actions and must deal with its aftermath.  The victim, for 
instance, must contend with being physically hurt or sustaining damage to 
his property.262
Where the victim played a role in the criminal act, the defendant’s 
action is more appropriately classified as a justification, and where he 
played no such role, the defendant’s action is better classified as an excuse.  
This dichotomy makes intuitive sense.  It is wrong for an innocent person to 
suffer because of something the defendant does.  These situations are thus 
better classified as excuses.  Indeed, as a matter of policy, we do not want to 
publically promote or encourage excused acts where victims innocently 
suffer.
  So it only seems fair that we center a classification theory 
on the victim’s role in the criminal act. 
263  On the other hand, if the victim intentionally puts the defendant 
in the position of committing the crime, the defendant’s action would be 
warranted and properly classified as a justification.  Here, the victim is 
directly culpable for the harm that befalls him.  We also want to publicly 
promote or encourage such actions so that future victims are deterred from 
putting other defendants in such positions.264
I need to say something more about what “role” means in this context.  
In one sense, every victim plays a role in the criminal act.  He voluntarily 
puts himself in the place and time where the act occurred.  In this way, 
every victim is a but-for cause of the defendant’s action.  I certainly do not 
want to suggest such a loose construction of the term.  The victim must 
have, in some direct way, caused the defendant’s actions.  Only then can we 
say the victim played a role in the crime. 
 
Let us start with the uncontroversial defenses of self-defense and 
insanity.  With self-defense, it is easy to see how the victim caused the 
defendant’s action.  The victim intentionally placed the defendant in a 
situation where he had to assault the victim lest he suffer physical harm 
himself.  It does not matter how many victims were involved or the nature 
of the threatened harm.  All that matters is that the victim forced the 
 
262 I am not suggesting that a victim is completely without any recourse.  They may have 
a tort claim against the defendant but this will require the victim to bring an action.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, 
Introduction, §§ 1, 4, 28 (2010) (discussing elements for tort recover for physical harm and 
property damage). 
263 This policy consideration tracks the definition of a decision rule discussed earlier.  
See supra subpart VII.E. 
264 This policy consideration tracks the definition of a conduct rule discussed earlier.  See 
supra subpart VII.E. 
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defendant to act.  The victim is directly culpable, thus making the case of 
self-defense a justification.265
Insanity, on the other hand, would be classified as an excuse under this 
theory because the victim had no role to play in the defendant’s action.  By 
definition, the defendant failed to appreciate the nature of the action.  His 
conduct was not the result of anything the victim did but rather stemmed 
from some internal mental defect.  So the victim cannot be said to have 
caused the defendant’s actions.  He innocently suffered at the hands of the 
defendant.  It does not matter if the defendant happens to choose the lesser 
of two evils.  The fact remains that the victim did not in any way force the 
defendant to act, thus making the case of insanity an excused act.  Again, 
policy considerations track this classification.  We do not want to promote 
or encourage this action so future defendants do not inappropriately believe 
that they can rely on the insanity defense to avoid punishment. 
  Policy considerations track our intuitions on 
this classification.  We want to promote or encourage this action so 
potential future victims are properly deterred from making such physical 
threats. 
A similar analysis applies in cases of duress and necessity.  Take the 
classic situation of a defendant destroying a dike because of physical threats 
(an instance of duress) or because of the potential flooding of more valuable 
property (an instance of necessity).  The first thing to note is that the victim 
here is the owner of the land protected by the dike and the harm caused 
constitutes the flooding of this person’s property.  In both cases, the victim 
is not in any real way responsible or culpable for the defendant’s action.  
The victim did not force the defendant to act.  Thus, unlike the case of self-
defense, the defendant’s actions would properly be considered excused acts 
or undesirable acts.  It is wrong to destroy an innocent person’s property. 
The perspective from which we view the defendant’s conduct is 
critical.  The defendant himself might argue that he had to destroy the 
property lest he suffer physical harm or more valuable property perish.  
From his particular perspective, this might be the correct or “justified” act.  
But our classification scheme cannot be based on the defendant’s personal 
viewpoint; rather it should take into account all the various participants and 
consequences.  To do otherwise would reduce the classification of these 
affirmative defenses to idiosyncratic beliefs of the defendant.266
 
265 A similar analysis applies in the case of the defense of another.  Here too, the 
defendant has no choice but to harm the victim lest the other person suffer physical harm.  
The victim again is directly culpable for the defendant’s actions. 
  For 
instance, such a narrow scope might improperly classify insanity as a 
266 Subjective beliefs are certainly relevant when assessing the legal viability of these 
two defenses.  See supra Parts II and III.  But even here, such beliefs must satisfy some 
objective reasonableness standard to survive legal scrutiny. 
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justification or self-defense as an excuse.  Even though he suffered from a 
mental defect, a defendant may believe that he was doing the right thing 
when he assaulted the victim.  But we would not say that this is a justified 
act; again, because the victim was not directly culpable, this situation is 
better classified as an excuse.  Conversely, a defendant who assaults a 
victim in self-defense may view his actions as wrong but unavoidable.  This 
would not change our conclusion that such conduct is better classified as a 
justification.  The point here is that our classification analysis must be 
objective in nature and cannot merely adopt the defendant’s point of view. 
Returning to our cases of necessity and duress, it is important to 
understand that the victim suffers the harm.  Whether or not the defendant 
chooses the lesser harm or thinks his actions are right, the fact remains that 
he destroys this person’s property.  The victim has no say in what the 
defendant does.  Rather, the victim is an unfortunate bystander whose 
property happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.  Does it 
make sense then to say that the defendant objectively did the right thing?  
Most if not all of us would probably destroy property in the face of physical 
threats.  But acting out of a basic desire for self-preservation does not 
automatically mean that our conduct becomes objectively justified even 
though we might subjectively believe that it is.  Such reasoning would mean 
that hurting an innocent person because of physical threats from a third 
party would also be considered a justified act.  Here too, we are acting out 
of self-preservation.  But most of us would say that hurting someone—who 
is completely innocent—in this way is wrong.  The same reasoning also 
makes destroying an innocent person’s property wrong.  The harm is no 
doubt less (property versus person), but the fact remains that the victim is 
not culpable in either case and does not deserve to innocently suffer.  In 
fact, destroying this property may have financial consequences that could 
hurt the victim and his family. 
The point here is that in all these situations, the innocent victim pays 
the price for the defendant’s actions.  Thus, these instances of duress and 
necessity are better classified as excused acts—wrongful conduct where we 
hold the defendant not criminally liable based on the specific 
circumstances.  Policy considerations also favor this classification.  We do 
not want to publicly promote the destruction of an innocent person’s 
property.  This could allow defendants to inappropriately invoke duress or 
necessity in situations where they happen to damage another person’s 
property. 
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One could construct a duress scenario in which the victim plays a 
direct role in the defendant’s destruction of the dike.267  For example, 
assume the victim is the owner of the land protected by the dike and he 
threatens to physically harm the defendant unless he destroys the dike.  
Here, the victim puts the defendant in the position where he has to destroy 
the dike (and thus flood the victim’s property) lest the defendant suffer 
physical harm.  This situation follows the case of self-defense and is thus 
better classified as a justification.  This makes sense.  We are not dealing 
anymore with the flooding of an innocent person’s property.  The victim 
forced the defendant’s hand.  Because he is directly culpable for the 
defendant’s conduct, this action is better understood as a justified act.  In 
fact, policy considerations favor encouraging these actions so that similarly 
situated future victims are properly deterred from physically threatening 
defendants in this way.  There is nothing problematic about duress being 
classified as a justification in one instance but an excuse in another.268  For 
one, the typical cases of duress will be classified as excuses.269
C. FURTHER CLARIFICATION ON THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM: THE 
CASES OF THE INNOCENT AGGRESSOR AND PROVOCATION 
  It is 
unlikely, for example, that a victim would intentionally coerce a defendant 
to destroy his own property.  In any case, my classification methodology 
hinges on the victim and so such scenarios are possible. 
So far I have focused on situations where it is clear whether or not the 
victim played a direct role in the defendant’s actions.  The cases of the 
innocent aggressor and provocation require a bit more explanation.  In the 
first, an aggressor threatens the defendant with bodily harm and the 
defendant responds in self-defense.  However, unlike the paradigmatic case 
of self-defense, the aggressor here involuntarily causes these threats.270  
One can imagine a hypothetical situation where the aggressor is 
sleepwalking and does not consciously realize that he is threatening the 
defendant with bodily harm.271
 
267 A victim in a case of necessity where natural forces created the threat (e.g., potential 
flooding of property) cannot by definition force the defendant to act.  This scenario then will 
always be classified as an excuse.  But as I have shown, federal cases interpret necessity 
broadly and include situations where the threats are manmade.  See supra subpart IV.A. 
  Alternatively, the aggressor may be under 
some hypnotic trance by a third party.  The point here is that the 
268 See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 1, at 1350 (“As a purely descriptive matter, the [duress] 
defense can function either as a justification or as an excuse.”). 
269 The aforementioned federal cases of necessity and duress would be classified as 
excused acts.  See infra subpart VIII.D. 
270 See BERGELSON, supra note 246, at 71–73. 
271 See id. at 72. 
2011] EXCUSING BEHAVIOR: DURESS AND NECESSITY 623 
aggressor—the ultimate victim of the defendant’s action—does not intend 
to hurt the defendant.  The defendant certainly should not be held criminally 
liable.  But is his action better classified as a justification or an excuse?  Did 
the defendant commit the right action or just one that should find him not 
guilty of the crime?  The victim certainly put the defendant in a situation 
where he was forced to act.  No one would say that the defendant should 
not have defended himself.  But this case feels different than the 
paradigmatic self-defense situation.  We sympathize with this victim in a 
way we do not with the victim in self-defense.  That is because the innocent 
aggressor was not really culpable for the harm that befell him.  He did not 
know that the defendant would be forced to physically hurt him.  He is 
more akin to the property owner whose land is unwittingly destroyed.  
Since the innocent aggressor—like the property owner—did not intend to 
hurt the defendant, it is hard to see how the defendant did the right thing.  
His conduct is better seen as undesirable and thus classified as an excuse. 
Policy considerations support this conclusion and favor distinguishing 
self-defense from the case of innocent aggressor.  With the former, we want 
to publically promote or encourage such conduct so future victims are 
deterred from assaulting defendants.  The same considerations do not apply 
in the case of the innocent aggressor.  There is no point to publicly promote 
the act of defending against an innocent aggressor.  By definition, the 
victim never intended to harm the defendant and so promoting such action 
serves no deterrent value.  This bolsters the conclusion that such actions are 
better understood as excused acts. 
So both a victim’s intent and actions are important when classifying 
these defenses.272  Specifically, a case of justification requires that the 
victim intended to physically harm the defendant and placed him in a 
situation where the defendant could not avoid causing the victim harm lest 
he suffer physical harm himself.273
 
272 It makes sense to focus on intent and actions here as these two components are also 
necessary before imposing criminal liability.  See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 4 (2010); 
United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) (“In the criminal law, both a culpable 
mens rea and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to occur.”). 
  Only then can the victim be said to have 
273 Insisting that the case of an innocent aggressor is better understood as a justification 
does not unravel my classification theory.  The victim’s role remains the key distinguishing 
factor.  Only this time, the focus would be exclusively on whether the victim placed the 
defendant (regardless of his intent or lack of it) in a situation where the defendant had to act. 
624 MONU BEDI [Vol. 101 
played a direct role in the crime.  In this way, a defendant’s response in the 
case of an innocent aggressor is properly labeled as an excuse.274
The victim also plays a prominent part in the case of provocation.  
Sometimes labeled heat of passion, this is an affirmative defense that seeks 
to reduce a defendant’s liability in homicide prosecutions.
 
275  The defendant 
is typically charged with intentional homicide or first-degree murder and 
seeks to reduce his conviction to manslaughter based on the fact that his 
actions were in the heat of passion or otherwise triggered by adequate 
provocation.276
 
274 This approach of focusing on intent and actions also preserves our intuitions with the 
case of mistaken self-defense (see supra Part V).  Here too, because the victim did not intend 
to harm the defendant, the defendant’s resulting action is more appropriately labeled an 
excuse.  Again, the defendant committed an undesirable act but the mitigating circumstances 
should find him not criminally liable.  Self-defense will rarely be classified as an excuse.  
But situations involving mistakes of facts or innocent aggressors are possible.  My focus on 
intent and actions would also potentially classify the battered women syndrome defense—
where continuous and systematic abuse of a woman causes her to ultimately attack her 
perpetrator—as a justification, assuming a federal court finds the affirmative defense legally 
viable as a version of self-defense.  See, e.g., United States v. Whitetail, 956 F.2d 857 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (finding that battered women syndrome can serve as a type of self-defense for a 
homicide charge but concluding that the instant facts did not support such an affirmative 
defense); ROBINSON, supra note 
  One can imagine the kind of case that could trigger such a 
defense.  For example, assume a husband walks in on his wife after she has 
been raped.  Let us also assume that the husband realizes that the 
perpetrator poses no further threat to him or his wife.  Even still, his sudden 
anger may provoke him to attack and possibly kill the perpetrator who is 
still in the room.  In a subsequent homicide prosecution, the defendant may 
raise the defense of provocation to lessen his liability.  This defense works 
differently than duress or necessity.  Whereas the latter defenses completely 
exculpate the defendant (that is, the defendant is found not guilty), a 
provocation defense simply reduces the defendant’s liability.  He is found 
guilty of a lesser-included offense, in this case manslaughter instead of 
murder or intentional homicide.  In this way, provocation can be considered 
172, at 407–26 (discussing to what extent battered women 
syndrome can be classified as a version of self-defense). 
275 See Lizama v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 245 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2001); United States 
v. Scafe, 822 F.2d 928, 932 (10th Cir. 1987); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1985) 
(describing manslaughter as “a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable 
explanation or excuse”). 
276 See United States v. Medina, 755 F.2d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir. 1985); 2A FED. JURY 
PRAC. & INSTR. § 45:09 (5th ed. 2000) (discussing how federal courts instruct juries on 
provocation or heat of passion where defendant seeks to reduce intentional homicide charge 
to manslaughter); 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 108 (2010) (“Passion in order to reduce murder to 
manslaughter must be of such a degree as would cause an ordinary person to act on impulse 
and without reflection.”). 
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a partial affirmative defense.  This fact should not change how we analyze 
this defense as a justification or excuse.277
Under my classification theory, this partial defense would constitute a 
(partial) excuse.
 
278  The victim did not, strictly speaking, play a direct role 
in the harm caused.  My definition requires that the victim intended to 
physically harm the defendant and placed him in a position where he could 
not avoid taking action against the victim.  Unlike the case of self-defense, 
the defendant could have restrained himself and not attacked the victim.  
The victim posed no physical threat to either the defendant or his wife.  In 
this way, the victim is not directly culpable for the defendant’s actions.  
One might push back on this conclusion.  By definition, this defense 
involves a victim who provoked or angered a defendant.  Surely then, it 
makes sense to say that the victim caused or is somehow culpable for this 
action.279
 
277 But see SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION 
OF HOMICIDE 13–14 (1994) (arguing that a partial defense can only be classified as an excuse 
because the defendant was still convicted of a crime). 
  There is no doubt that the victim is partially to blame for what 
has happened.  This is what makes us sympathetic to the defendant and 
what allows us to reduce his criminal liability.  But this does not mean that 
the defendant’s resulting act should be considered a justification.  Quite the 
contrary, the defendant did something wrong.  Remember, neither he nor 
his wife were under any threat of physical harm, so the victim did not 
deserve this kind of retribution (despite his immoral act).  The defendant’s 
resulting attack should therefore be classified as an excuse—wrongful 
behavior that we excuse on account of the victim’s sexual assault of the 
defendant’s wife.  Policy considerations favor classifying provocation in 
this way.  We do not want to publicly promote or encourage attacking a 
victim if they pose no physical threat to anyone. 
278 But see BERGELSON, supra note 246, at 32–34 (arguing that provocation is best 
understood as a partial justification); Susan D. Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and 
the Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 197 (2005) (arguing that provocation is better 
understood as a justification instead of excuse); ROBINSON, supra note 172 at 319–41 
(differing views on whether provocation is a justification or excuse). 
279 Bergelson relies on the victim’s culpability to argue that provocation serves more as a 
justification than an excuse.  See BERGELSON, supra note 246, at 32–34.  No one would 
suggest that this victim is not in some way culpable for what happened, particularly in 
contrast to a victim who did not provoke the defendant.  But this does not mean the action 
taken by the defendant automatically becomes a justified act.  Bergelson interprets 
culpability too broadly; a victim can be partly culpable for the defendant’s action, even 
though the action is better classified as an excuse. 
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D. THE GOVERNMENT AS THE VICTIM 
The victim in the above-mentioned cases is obvious.  In other cases, 
however, the victim is not so readily identifiable.  For example, the federal 
cases of duress and necessity cited do not appear to have a victim.  They 
include, for example, situations where a defendant has been charged with 
escaping from jail,280 violating federal drug laws,281 unlawfully possessing a 
firearm,282 or illegally entering a restricted government area.283  None of 
these offenses seem to involve a victim.  Unlike the cases of self-defense or 
provocation, here there is no person that suffers any harm.  Indeed, 
effectuating these crimes does not even require the presence of another 
person.  For example, the elements of illegal possession of drugs or 
unlawful escape from custody do not contemplate the involvement of 
another party.284  One response would be that because there is no victim, by 
definition, no victim played a role in the defendant’s action and, thus, these 
situations are better classified as excuses.  This labeling preserves our 
intuitions about these instances of duress and necessity.  The defendants did 
something wrong but specific circumstances make them not blameworthy.  
As a policy matter, most of us would also say that violating federal drug 
laws or escaping from prison—similar to flooding an innocent person’s 
property—are not actions that we should encourage, even though these 
defendants may not be criminally liable.285
A more comprehensive approach focuses on the government as the 
victim.  Federal law defines a “crime victim” as “a person directly or 




280 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). 
  
The harm here would be the government’s financial burden in investigating 
and prosecuting the defendant’s conduct.  Of course, this is a very different 
type of harm from what a traditional victim suffers.  The defendant does not 
281 See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001); 
United States v. Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Vasquez-
Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir. 2008); Raich v. Gonzalez, 500 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 
2007); United States v. Lizalde, 38 F. App’x 657 (2d Cir. 2002). 
282 See, e.g., United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Al-
Rekabi, 454 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2006). 
283 See, e.g., United States v. Ayala, 289 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2002). 
284 See 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (2006) (describing the elements of escape from custody 
without reference to other parties); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006) (describing the elements of 
illegal possession of narcotics without reference to other parties). 
285 This could conclude the discussion on the subject.  What follows though is an 
approach that seeks to expand the notion of a “victim” in cases where there is no apparent 
victim.  
286 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (2006). 
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destroy or otherwise damage government property.  Still, the government 
must expend resources to enforce the purported violation of federal law. 
Federal jurisprudence lends support to the idea of the government 
serving as a victim in this way.  Courts have considered the government a 
victim where it has suffered direct financial harm and have ordered the 
defendant to pay appropriate restitution.287  As one circuit stated, “it is by 
now settled that a government entity (local, state, or federal) may be a 
‘victim’ [under applicable federal law] . . . (and may be awarded restitution) 
when it has passively suffered harm resulting directly from the defendant’s 
criminal conduct, as from fraud or embezzlement.”288  Courts, for example, 
have ordered restitution to the government where a defendant falsified 
federal postal money orders289 or where a defendant unlawfully received 
federal disability benefits.290  The Third Circuit, in United States v. Hand, 
provides the most compelling fact pattern for a restitution award to the 
government.291  Here, a juror in a federal trial pleaded guilty to contempt of 
court by engaging in impermissible contact with one of the defendants 
during jury deliberations.292  This behavior resulted in a mistrial and 
necessitated the retrial of the defendants.293  The Third Circuit explained 
that the government, and in particular “the U.S. Attorney’s Office . . . 
expended time and resources” in a trial that was “rendered futile” by the 
actions of the defendant.294  In this way, the government was “harmed by 
[the defendant’s] action,” and was appropriately considered a victim who 
warranted restitution.295  The court affirmed a restitution judgment against 
the defendant for the wages of the federal employees involved in the 
mistrial.296
 
287 See 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2006) (using the same definition of victim as found in 18 
U.S.C. § 3771(e) and noting that a court may order the defendant to reimburse the victim for 
“expenses related to participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense”); United 
States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that the government can be 
considered a victim under  18 U.S.C. § 3663 and receive restitution); Ratliff v. United States, 
999 F.2d 1023, 1027 (6th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases where courts have found the 
government to be a victim that requires restitution). 
 
288 Gibbens, 25 F.3d at 32; see also United States v. Dudley, 739 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 
1984) (finding restitution to government appropriate where defendant unlawfully used 
federal food stamps). 
289 United States v. Lincoln, 277 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2002). 
290 United States v. Streebing, 987 F.2d 368, 374 (6th Cir. 1993). 
291 United States v. Hand, 863 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir. 1998). 
292 See id. at 1102. 
293 See id.  The defendants all ultimately pleaded guilty before retrial.  Id. 
294 See id. at 1103. 
295 See id. at 1104. 
296 See id. at 1102–03. 
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The aforementioned cases of duress and necessity do not involve 
instances where a defendant misappropriated government funds or 
interfered with a federal trial.  The government can still be seen as 
expending financial resources because of the defendant’s conduct, only this 
time the financial harm is forward-looking.  Specifically, the government 
must enforce the law that was allegedly violated.  This requires 
investigating the matter and ultimately bringing charges against the 
defendant.  This does not mean that the government becomes a victim for 
the purposes of restitution.  In fact, courts have explicitly disallowed 
restitution for such costs.297  The above cited federal restitution law 
however supports my contention that future financial costs associated with 
the offense can make the government a victim, at least for the purposes of 
classifying cases of duress and necessity.  My concern here is identifying a 
victim and understanding his role in the crime, not arguing under what 
circumstances they deserve restitution.  In fact, it makes little sense to say 
that the defendant should reimburse the government for its troubles where a 
court finds a defendant not guilty based on a successful defense of duress or 
necessity.298
This means that the federal government is the victim in all federal 
crimes, including cases where there is also an identifiable person.  Even 
here, (e.g., a case of self-defense) the government spends resources to 
investigate the circumstances surrounding the alleged offense and prosecute 
the defendant.  There is nothing problematic about the government being 
the victim in every case.  It will rarely play a direct role in the defendant’s 
actions.  For all practical purposes then, the government will be merely a 
nominal victim and the focus will remain on the individuals involved to 
ascertain whether the defendant’s actions constitute an excuse or 
justification. 
  Similar reasoning applies in a successful case of self-defense.  
There too, we can identify the victim but no one would suggest the 
defendant should pay the victim restitution for medical or other relevant 
costs. 
Nevertheless, as a victim, the government is subject to the same test as 
an individual victim when it comes to classifying these cases.  If the 
government intended to harm the defendant and put him in a situation 
where the defendant could not avoid committing the crime lest he suffer 
physical harm himself, the defendant’s action would appropriately be 
 
297 See United States v. Salcedo-Lopez, 907 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that 
“[t]he costs of investigating and prosecuting an offense are not direct losses for which 
restitution may be ordered”). 
298 Cf. United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that the 
government is not entitled to restitution where it provokes the commission of the offense 
through a sting operation where it lost money). 
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classified as a justification.  However, if the government played no such 
role, the defendant’s action is better classified as an excused act.  This 
sounds right.  The defendant’s action is warranted only where the 
government is directly culpable for the offense.  Otherwise, the government 
innocently suffers financial harm, similar to the victim whose property is 
destroyed.  In such a case, the defendant committed a wrong, though the 
mitigating circumstances make him not criminally liable.  Policy 
considerations track this sentiment.  For instance, most of us would say that 
we generally should not promote or encourage federal drug violations or the 
unlawful possession of firearms. 
The idea of the government as the “suffering victim” may not be 
readily acceptable.  Take the example of the defendant dealing drugs to an 
undercover agent in the face of physical threats to himself and his family 
from the mafia.  The defendant does not appear to be hurting anyone by 
committing this crime.  In fact, he is trying to save his family from bodily 
harm.  Is it really fair then to say that the defendant’s conduct constitutes an 
excuse?  The victim may not have a face and the injury may not be 
immediate.  This should not change our analysis.  Suppose this defendant 
had to steal money from an innocent person in order to save his family from 
unlawful threats.  This situation is more easily identified as an excuse and 
tracks the analysis of the destruction of an innocent person’s property 
described earlier.  Again, the victim from whom the defendant steals 
innocently suffers.299
Only one of the aforementioned federal cases would potentially fall 
into the justification category.
  The government suffers in the same way.  By 
committing the drug violation, the defendant effectively takes money away 
from the government that could be used for other services and forces the 
government to spend the money on investigating and prosecuting the crime. 
300
 
299 It should not matter how much money the defendant takes.  I realize that the smaller 
the amount, the less likely we are to disapprove of the defendant’s action.  Like with any 
crime, the less harm the defendant causes, the more quickly we may forgive him or the less 
harshly we may judge him.  This does not change the fact that the defendant committed a 
crime.  Similarly, the fact remains that under these circumstances, the defendant’s invocation 
of duress constitutes an excuse. 
  United States v. Bailey provides the most 
compelling fact pattern in which the government would be directly 
300 In none of the other cases of duress or necessity did the government threaten or 
otherwise cause the defendant to violate federal law.  At most, the government may have 
created the situation that motivated the defendant to commit a crime.  See United States v. 
Ayala, 289 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2002), where defendant illegally entered restricted area to 
protect endangered species from bombing.  Even here, though, the government did not force 
the defendants to illegally enter the restricted area by threats of physical harm.  Id.  In fact, 
defendants were free to pursue other legal methods to stop this bombing.  Id. at 26–27. 
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responsible for the defendants’ actions.301  Here, the defendants alleged that 
the prison guards intentionally created unbearable living conditions that 
forced them to escape in order to avoid physical harm.302  Specifically, the 
guards beat the defendants and made threats on their lives.303  The 
defendants also alleged that the guards set fire to various objects, causing 
smoke to build up in the prison cells.304  The Court ultimately decided that 
the defendants were not entitled to a duress defense because they did not 
immediately surrender after their escape.305  So the Court never reached the 
issue of whether the defendants presented sufficient evidence of coercion 
warranting their escape.306  However, assuming the defendants presented a 
legally viable defense, their escape would probably be categorized as a 
justification.  The government—through the actions of the prison guards—
intentionally threatened the defendants’ lives and left them with no option 
but to escape.307
The idea of the government playing a part in a defendant’s criminal act 
is nothing new.  The entrapment defense has long been recognized in 
situations where a court finds the defendant not guilty of the crime due to 
the actions of the government.
  By staying in prison, the defendants ran a real risk of 
being physically injured.  Classifying their escape as a justification tracks 
our intuitions.  The government is directly culpable, making the defendants’ 
conduct a warranted act.  Furthermore, as a policy matter we certainly 
would want to encourage such federal violations so that the government is 




301 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). 
  Under a successful application of this 
doctrine, a court finds that the government implanted or otherwise created 
in the defendant’s mind the predisposition to commit the criminal act and 
302 Id. at 410. 
303 Id. at 398. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 412. 
306 Id. 
307 I assume here that we can attribute the guard’s actions to the government.  Cf. id. at 
423 (“It cannot be doubted that excessive or unprovoked violence and brutality inflicted by 
prison guards upon inmates violates the Eighth Amendment.”) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
308 See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 542 (1992); United States v. Russell, 
411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 437 (1932); Jess D. 
Mekeel, Misnamed, Misapplied, and Misguided: Clarifying the State of Sentencing 
Entrapment and Proposing a New Conception of the Doctrine, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1583, 1588 (2006) (describing the long history of the entrapment defense in American 
jurisprudence). 
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then induced him to commit the crime.309  For instance, the Supreme Court 
found entrapment where the government informant repeatedly prodded and 
ultimately persuaded the defendant to take part in a narcotics sale.310
Under my classification theory, the affirmative defense of 
entrapment—like provocation—constitutes an excused act.  As the victim, 
the government employed coercive techniques to facilitate the commission 
of the offense.  But, strictly speaking, it did not force the defendant’s hand.  
The entrapped defendant—like his provoked counterpart describe above—
was free not to commit the crime without suffering any harm.  This is very 
different from the prisoner case where the defendants were going to be 
physically harmed if they did not violate the law and escape.  In the 
narcotics case, for example, the defendant could have abstained from selling 
drugs to the informant without suffering any harm to himself.  This analysis 
does not take away from the fact that the government—like its counterpart 
in the provocation case—is partly culpable for the crime.  Indeed, this 




  Still, 
this action is more appropriately classified as an excuse.  The government is 
not directly culpable, and so the defendant is wrong to have committed the 
crime.  Again, policy considerations favor this classification.  We do not 
want to encourage defendants to commit crimes in the hopes that they can 
argue that the government somehow coerced their actions. 
Scholars who have sought to classify necessity and duress have 
focused too much on the defendant or what he does.  They have neglected 
the central figure who suffers the harm.  Ironically perhaps, the victim 
provides the key to understanding what makes an action a justification or 
excuse.  My theory classifies most affirmative defenses as excuses.  Only 
cases of self-defense would realistically be classified as justified acts.  
Almost all instances of duress and necessity (and certainly most of the 
federal cases cited) would be considered excused acts.  There could be rare 
 
309 Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 548; see also United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 
2000) (“The defense [of entrapment] has two elements: (1) government inducement of the 
crime, and (2) lack of predisposition on the defendant’s part.” (internal quotations and 
citation omitted)); Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 827, 831–34 (2004) (describing the elements of entrapment). 
310 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S 369 (1958). 
311 See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376 (arguing the purpose of entrapment is to prevent 
government from taking advantage of the “weaknesses of an innocent party” and trick him or 
her into “committing crimes which he [or she] otherwise would not have attempted”); 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932) (noting the availability of the entrapment 
defense to “persons otherwise innocent” who are lured by the government to commit the 
crime). 
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instances of duress and necessity where a victim directly played a role in 
the defendant’s action.  But this is certainly the exception, and not the rule. 
There is nothing problematic about such a restrictive notion of 
justification.  This tracks our intuitions on this kind of classification.  A 
justification is the right action or the one that benefits society.  Most 
criminal offenses do not and should not bear this label.  The defendant is 
wrong to have committed these violations.  When asked why, a compelling 
answer is that an innocent victim suffers at the hands of the defendant.  
Whether it is the destruction of property, physical harm, or financial cost, 
the victim is generally not blamed for what happened.  How then can we 
classify any such action by the defendant as a justification?  We should not.  
At best, the defendant should be found not guilty based on mitigating 
circumstances such as duress or necessity.  The label excuse then more 
accurately captures our feelings about these situations.  Our intuitions are 
different where the victim forced the defendant’s hand by physical threats.  
Here, the victim is directly culpable for the harm he suffers.  It makes sense 
then that these situations are classified as justifications.  As a policy matter, 
we also want to encourage these actions so future victims are sufficiently 
deterred from putting defendants in such positions. 
The defendant no doubt will and should remain the center of attention 
when courts pass judgment on liability and punishment.  But the labels of 
justification and excuse do not exclusively reside in the legal realm.  They 
represent a more general opinion on what we think of defenses such as 
necessity and duress.  So it makes sense that our focus goes beyond simply 
what the defendant thought and did.  By focusing on the victim, we create a 
truly comprehensive theory that accurately captures the nature of these 
affirmative defenses and preserves our intuitions on their classification. 
